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VOLUME 77 SUMMER 2003 NUMBER 3
ARTICLES
FACE TO FACE: A CALL FOR RADICAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN PLACE OF
COMPASSION
LOIS SHEPHERDt
"We all are responsible for everything and everyone in the face of
everybody, and I more than the others."
INTRODUCTION
The problem with compassion is not that it is too emotional
or irrational, not that it is unprincipled or counter to the rule of
law, not that it is too intrusive or interfering. Although these
have been the traditional arguments against any significant role
for compassion in law and social policy, they have been soundly
countered by recent scholars and jurists. Compassionate
responses, we have learned, can be rational, principled, and
respectful of autonomy. When we feel compassion it is for good
reasons; our emotional response to someone else's suffering can
prompt us to sort through those reasons, to discover the
conditions that cause that suffering, and to improve our
judgment.
This is good, but compassion is not enough. It allows us to
peek outside the window of our enclosed tower, to imagine what
might be experienced by those below, and to do nothing.
t Associate Professor, The Florida State University College of Law.
I This sentence from Dostoyevsky is a favorite of Emmanuel Levinas, who was
heavily influenced by Dostoyevsky's works. See ADRIAAN PEPERZAK, TO THE OTHER:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS 171 (1993). In the
1976 Norton Critical Edition of The Brothers Karamazov, this sentiment is not
expressed exactly as quoted but is found generally in Notes of the Life in God of the
Elder Zosima. See FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 268, 299
(Ralph E. Matlaw ed., Constance Garnett translation revised by Ralph E. Matlaw
1976); see also EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ETHICS AND INFINITY 98 & 101 (Richard A.
Cohen trans., 1985) (conversations with Philippe Nemo in which Emmanuel Levinas
quotes Dostoyevsky for this point, in two different versions).
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Consider Joshua DeShaney. 2 State workers had reliable
reports that the four-year-old boy was subject to repeated
physical abuse by his father, but they did nothing to protect him.
Joshua eventually suffered so great a beating that he fell into a
coma; when he emerged from the coma, he was permanently and
profoundly retarded.3 When the Supreme Court heard his claim
that the state protective agency should have acted to protect
him, it expressed compassion. "The facts of this case are
undeniably tragic,"4 we are told. "Judges and lawyers, like other
humans, are moved by natural sympathy in a case like
this . . .5
But the Court refused to consider whether and how the
Wisconsin state agency should have acted under the
circumstances given what it knew, whether it exercised poor
judgment, or whether it exhibited indifference to the welfare of
the child. 6 Such an inquiry was deemed unnecessary because,
although the justices may have felt compassion, they would not
"yieldf to that impulse"7 in any way that imposed any obligation
on any state governmental agency or employee to actually help
the child. Chief Justice Rehnquist cautioned us "to remember
2 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
:1 Id. at 191-93.
4 Id. at 191.
Id. at 202-03.
3 Id. at 201-02.
7 Id. at 202-03. Jurists are often so admonished not to let their judgments be
clouded by compassion. For example, in defending its ban against physician-assisted
suicide in the Supreme Court case of Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997), the State of Washington urged the Court not to be swayed by its compassion
for the patient-plaintiffs. Brief for the Petitioners at 16, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
While it acknowledged that the plaintiffs' stories were compelling ("These accounts
cannot be read without evoking at least two strong emotional reactions-sympathy
for those afflicted, and apprehensiveness that some day a similar fate may befall the
reader or a loved one." Id.), the state insisted that the Court's jurisprudence "has
not been and should not be determined on the basis of anecdotes, no matter what
points they make or how compellingly they make them" and that the Court should
focus "in a principled manner" on the needs of the society as a whole, building upon
its prior jurisprudence. Id. at 18; see also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49
F.3d 586, 588, 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Compassion is a proper, desirable, even
necessary component of judicial character; but compassion is not the most
important, certainly not the sole law of human existence. Unrestrained by other
virtues .... it leads to catastrophe. Justice, prudence, and fortitude are necessary
too. Compassion cannot be the compass of a federal judge. That compass is the
Constitution of the United States."), rev'd en banc 79 F.3d 790 (1996), rev'd sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (denying existence of constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill).
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once again that the harm was inflicted not by the State of
Wisconsin, but by Joshua's father."8 The Constitution does not
give people rights to receive anything from the state but only
gives them rights to avoid state interference in their lives. 9 No
matter that what the child needed was state interference or
intrusion into his life, not freedom from such interference. He
was not entitled to help, and there was really little need to
discuss it further.10  In a culture and jurisprudence that
celebrates the people's right to hands off government, hands off
includes a helping hand.
Compassion, as commonly thought of, motivates or prompts
but does not actually require action. Moreover, it often allows us
to stay within our own walls and simply peer out, making it
presumptuous and self-referential. For these and other reasons,
drawing on the radical ethical writings of the late twentieth-
century philosopher Emmanuel Levinas,1' I propose in this
8 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
9) The majority opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist reads:
The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. It
forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property
without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be extended to
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests
do not come to harm through other means.
Id. at 195.
10 As Justice Brennan's dissent points out:
Presumably, then, [under the majority's analysis] if respondents decided
not to help Joshua because his name began with a 'J,' or because he was
born in the spring, or because they did not care enough about him even to
formulate an intent to discriminate against him based on an arbitrary
reason, respondents would not be liable to the DeShaneys because they
were not the ones who dealt the blows that destroyed Joshua's life.
Id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.) Justice
Brennan's primary disagreement with the majority was that it characterized the
issue as one simply of whether a person has a right to basic governmental services
rather than recognizing that in this case the state may have undertaken a vital
duty to provide protection and then ignored it. See id. at 203-05, 212 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
1 Levinas scholar Adriaan Peperzak explains that "[s]ince 1961 the work of
Emmanuel Levinas has slowly acquired a pivotal position in the world of
philosophy." PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at ix. Others have called him "one of the most
profound, exacting, and original philosophers of twentieth-century Europe" and
"[o]ne of the most significant ethical thinkers of the twentieth century." A.T. Nuyen,
Ldvinas and the Ethics of Pity, 40 INT'L PHIL. Q. 411 (2000) (citing SEAN HAND, THE
LtVINAS READER V (1989); THE CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY READER 122 (Richard
Kearney & Mara Rainwater eds., 1996)). Emmanuel Levinas was born to Jewish
parents in 1906 in Lithuania, where he was steeped in Jewish orthodoxy but also
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Article to interrupt any complacent acceptance of the idea that
compassion, as we commonly understand and apply it, is an
adequate ethical response to someone who is suffering.
I take as a given that there is a place for caring, humane,
sympathetic, and empathetic responses towards people whose
lives are implicated in the decisions of our courts, our laws, and
our actions. Indeed, as scholars Robin West, 12  Martha
Nussbaum, 13 and Lynne Henderson 4 have written, and Justice
early confronted with Russian Christianity and the work of Russian authors. He
emigrated to France in 1923 and became a French citizen in 1930. Levinas was
captured during the Nazi occupation of France and sent to a prisoners' camp where
he was required to do forced labor. His parents and brothers were murdered by Nazi
collaborators in Eastern Europe. PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 2-4. This experience
and the times in which he lived may provide some understanding of his concerns
about totalitarianism. See infra notes 110-120 and accompanying text. The corpus
of his work is split between theological and philosophical writings. He was an early
student of the German philosopher Heidegger but ultimately became one of his
greatest critics. See PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 3-4. While his earliest philosophical
writings critique Heidegger's approach, Levinas soon began developing his own
account of metaphysical ethics, as embodied in his two most influential works,
Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. See id. at 5-7.
12 In her book Caring for Justice, West argues for a vision of justice that
includes an essential component of care. Justice without care, she writes, is not only
not caring, it is not justice. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 24 (1997). If, West
writes, "the act of caring for others to whom we are connected in some way is central
to our moral lives, then our capacity for care should be at the center of our
understanding of our public and legal, as well as private and personal, virtues, and
specifically... should be central to the meaning of legal justice." Id. at 9. Thus,
justice cannot be done without attention to and concern for the needs of the people
whose rights and responsibilities are being adjudicated.
1-3 Martha Nussbaum tells us that "compassion, in the philosophical tradition,
is a central bridge between the individual and the community." Martha C.
Nussbaum, Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion, 13 SoC. PHIL. & POL'Y. 27, 28
(1996) [hereinafter Compassion] and that as such, we should "understand better
how to produce it and how to remove obstacles to it." Id. She advocates a civic,
public education in compassion, largely through the study of the humanities and the
arts, as a way to train individuals to imagine the pain and experiences of others and
to "cross boundaries of class, nationality, race, and gender." Id. at 50-51. According
to Nussbaum, we should seek political leaders who display compassion, who are
capable of imagining the pain of others. See id. at 51. On a broader scope, we should
judge economic conditions not by GNP per capita, but by quality-of-life
measurements, and we should structure our public institutions in ways informed by
compassion, creating "institutions that place people in similar circumstances,
weakening or removing hierarchies of wealth, gender, and class." See id. at 52-53,
57. See generally MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE (1995).
14 Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576
(1987) (rejecting the assumption that legality and empathy "are mutually exclusive
concepts"); see also SUSAN M. BEHUNIAK, A CARING JURISPRUDENCE 122-28 (1999)
(arguing that to integrate caring and justice in the decision-making of the Supreme
Court requires the Court to listen to the knowledge of those affected by the decisions
[Vol.77:445
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Blackmun has urged his fellow justices to recognize, 15 I agree
that caring responses should play a greater role in our law and
policy decisions, and we should better recognize and legitimize
its current role. The impulse is correct; cold interpretations of
the law are not just. 16 I am concerned, however, about what
such caring responses should comprise. Compassion is
problematic in a number of ways and requires careful unpacking.
We generally think of compassion as an emotional response to
another's suffering that we come to by way of imagining
ourselves to be in that person's shoes. Compassion respects the
equality of all people, as opposed to pity, which is thought to
and to appreciate the nature of injuries that litigants claim, rather than simply the
legitimacy of their rights); Judith S. Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate
Judging. A Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1988);
Laurence H. Tribe, Remarks: Revisiting the Rule of Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 726,
729-30 (1989) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney and stating,
"There need be no ultimate conflict between the Rule of Law and the Rule of
Love .... [T]o say that our idea of 'law' is to be constructed with straightedge and
compass, without sympathy and compassion, is dead wrong.").
15 Justice Blackmun, in dissent in DeShaney, criticizes what he sees as the
majority's incapacity to incorporate its compassion into a broader reading of the
precedent cases: "Faced with the choice [between a broad or narrow reading of the
precedents], I would adopt a 'sympathetic' reading, one which comports with
dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled
from the province of judging." 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a
discussion about the proper role of compassion in the DeShaney controversy as
represented by Blackmun's dissent, see Benjamin Zipursky, Note, DeShaney and
the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101 (1990). Justice Blackmun
urged his fellow justices toward compassion and sympathy in other contexts as well.
The author of the original abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, and one of the
staunchest supporters of the abortion right, Justice Blackmun repeatedly described
the harms of unwanted motherhood in his opinions. See Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts
women's bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer
the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care.");
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 558 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("Of the aspirations and settled understandings of American women, of
the inevitable and brutal consequences of what it is doing, the tough-approach
plurality utters not a word. This silence is callous."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) ("The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent."). See generally Stephen Breyer, In
Memoriam: Justice Harry A. Blackmun: Principle and Compassion, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1393, 1396 (1999) (writing that Blackmun's vision as a justice grew out of
compassion).
16 See generally DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court's failure to be moved by compassion prevents it from understanding
either the facts or legal norms of the case); WEST, supra note 12.
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invoke claims of superiority. Compassion motivates us to want
to help the object of our compassion. Again, this all sounds good.
Understanding or attempting to understand the concrete
experiences of particular individuals, by imagining oneself to be
in their situation, can improve the accuracy of evaluative
judgments needed to sort out the equities involved in a
particular situation. 17
At the same time, I have long been concerned about the idea
that we can imagine what someone else suffers. Many troubling
actions have been taken in the name or under the guise of
compassion for others. Some of these past actions seem quite
obvious now as not having been based truly on fellow feeling and
have received universal condemnation-the extermination of
children with mental disabilities by doctors in Nazi Germany is
one such example.18 Some currently accepted practices bear the
marks of similar, compassionate rhetoric and some of the same
ethically troubling consequences. I am thinking here of prenatal
genetic screening practices that aim to reduce the incidence of
mental retardation, for example, by avoiding the births of certain
children, or the effect that compassion may have on the elderly
or people with disabilities, when offered by healthy middle-aged
people who may cringe with horror at imagining themselves
elderly, infirm, incontinent, or dependent on others. To the
extent some of the current right-to-die advocacy depends upon
expressions of compassion rather than simply respect for
autonomy, it carries troubling elements of presumptiveness and
projection.
17 See generally Compassion, supra note 13.
8 See Robert N. Proctor, Nazi Doctors, Racial Medicine, and Human
Experimentation, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 23-25 (George
J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992) (explaining the popularity within and
outside the medical community for euthanizing those with mental disabilities or
other qualities that made their "lives not worth living," including children). Proctor
writes, "Parents were made to feel shame and embarrassment at having to raise an
abnormal or malformed child. Hospital archives are full of letters from parents
requesting their children be granted euthanasia." Id. at 25; see also Paul A.
Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ??? are Enough?, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 191 (2003) (drawing parallels between the motives and methods
of past eugenic practices and the current pursuit of genetic advances); Paul K.
Longmore, Elizabeth Bouuia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3 ISSUES L. &
MED. 141, 147 (1987) (stating that many of the Nazi doctors "were well-intentioned,
even compassionate men, who were convinced that both society and people with
disabilities themselves would be better off if they were relieved of their burdensome
lives").
[Vol.77:445
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I have also been concerned about the seemingly
noncommittal aspect of compassion, both the voluntary nature of
the feeling-decision makers can't be required to feel
compassion-and the voluntary nature of taking action.
Forgetting for the moment about policymakers or judges, my
grappling with this aspect of compassion has also had a personal
component. Like many people, I suspect there have been many
times when I have felt compassion but have quickly turned my
attention away, and done nothing. It felt wrong and it still does.
Emmanuel Levinas did think something was wrong. His
work centered on the responsibility that one human being has
for another, and in my view, the ethical response he identifies
requires much more than compassion. Some authors have
suggested that Levinas's writings might be aligned with the
approach of an "ethic of care"1 9 or with a greater role for
19 By "ethic of care," I refer to the work of relational feminists originating in
Carol Gilligan's empirical work about the differences in moral reasoning between
girls and boys, women and men. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE (1982). Generally, the ethic of care is understood to claim that "the act of
caring for others to whom we are connected in some way is central to our moral
lives," and should inform our moral reasoning. WEST, supra note 12, at 9. With
respect to the similarities between Levinas' work and the ethic of care, see, e.g.,
Myra Bookman & Mitchell Aboulafia, Ethics of Care Revisited: Gilligan and
Levinas, 44 PHIL. TODAY 169, 171 (2000), which argues that while Levinas writes
in a phenomenological and philosophical tradition and Gilligan in the social sciences
tradition, both reject autonomy as the beginning point for understanding ethics.
"Both, for example, isolate the problem of egoism, whereby reducing the other to the
same results in a moral ideal of 'symmetry' and 'reciprocity.' " Id. Bookman and
Aboulafia point out important similarities between the work of Levinas and
Gilligan, but as often conceived, the ethic of care refers to the requirement of care
toward intimates (families and friends) and the "proximate stranger" and does not
describe the obligations owed to those outside that "scope of... care." See Hilde L.
Nelson, Against Caring, 3 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 8, 8, 11 (1992) (arguing that because
the ethics of care is limited in this way, it cannot provide answers to questions of
social justice). But see Nel Noddings, In Defense of Caring, 3 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 15,
17 (1992) (agreeing that much work is to be done, but that an ethics of caring can
address social problems).
Parenthetically, both Nelson and Noddings discuss a hypothetical in which a
nurse is dismayed that she has been placed in a position of providing amniocentesis
counseling services to a couple who plan to abort if they discover that the woman is
pregnant with a girl rather than a boy. While the focus of Nelson and Nodding's
disagreement is on how the ethic of care might apply in this nursing situation in a
way that values the nurse's abhorrence of such devaluation of females, neither
challenges in any way one of the assumptions within the hypothetical itself: that
amniocentesis to avoid Down syndrome is perfectly acceptable. That assumption, I
submit, is troubling under the orientation that Levinas' work provides. See infra
text accompanying notes 67-69, 98-108 for a discussion of such prenatal testing and
selection practices.
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compassion in issues of public policy or adjudication.20 Although
I believe that is true as a general matter, I think it is much more
useful and interesting to consider the ways the radical
philosophy of Levinas challenges rather than supports our
current ideas of what an ethical response based on care would
require. Compassion is not enough; compassion also sometimes
misses the mark.
At heart, Levinas's ethics laud hospitality or welcome of the
other person, of each other person, which is a dimension not
incompatible with compassion but not in required tandem of it
either.2 1 In addition, while compassion permits its object to
remain, in some ways, just that, an object-something that is
understood by the observer through self knowledge-an ethical
response prompted by Levinas's writings would require
recognition and appreciation of the unique "otherness" or
"alterity" of the other person. 22 Furthermore, the observer would
not be permitted, as compassion allows, to superimpose her own
view of the world and what it is and means to suffer on the one
who is suffering but would instead be changed-ruptured-by
the encounter with the other person, to be in relation with him
in a way that she is no longer merely an observer.23 Levinas's
ethics call for responsibility as well, responsibility to the other
person for her suffering and needs, and in this way is radically
different from compassion, which may motivate good and caring
deeds, but not obligate oneself to them. Compassion is an ethical
response premised on equality, yet the obligation Levinas
describes is one of unequal personal responsibility, as Levinas's
favored quote from Dostoyevsky, quoted earlier, makes clear.
In Part I of this Article, I set out the current understanding
of compassion as an ethical response to another person who
suffers. I will discuss the shortcomings that flow from
compassion's emphasis on imaginative dwelling of the other
person's condition, on its assumed basis in equality, and on its
lack of any corresponding duties. In Part II, I suggest an
alternative to compassion in the form of an ethics of radical
responsibility, drawing on Levinas's work on welcome, alterity,
20 See, e.g., Nuyen, supra note 11, at 416-17 (stating that the motivation to
follow Levinas' ethics can be found in the feeling of pity).
21 See infra text accompanying notes 94-116.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 110-26.
2 1 See infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
[Vol.77:445
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rupture, and responsibility. Finally, in Part III, I contrast the
approaches of two legal cases in which patients received
approval for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
Despite the similarity of results, the opinions in those cases
differ widely in their orientation toward the patient: one
revealing the inadequacies of an approach based on what might
be understood as compassion; the other adopting an approach
more consonant with an ethics of radical responsibility.
I. COMPASSION
"It's considered an absolute necessity these days for writers to
have compassion. Compassion is a word that sounds good in
anybody's mouth and which no book jacket can do without. It is
a quality which no one can put his finger on in any exact critical
sense, so it is always safe for anybody to use."24
A. What is Compassion?
Compassion literally means, "to suffer together with."25 Its
use suggests that the object of compassion is suffering and not
merely some inconvenience but a deeper injury, whether it is
physical or mental pain, deprivation, or loss. According to
Lawrence Blum, "The negative condition must be relatively
central to a person's life and well-being, describable as pain,
misery, hardship, suffering, affliction, and the like."26  The
suffering must be "serious rather than trivial 27 according to
Martha Nussbaum, to have some size, as Aristotle explained. 28
Because the size or depth of the suffering is evaluated from the
perspective of the observer or the one who feels compassion, it
requires judgment. 29  Compassion is not emotion without
reason.30 We are not likely to feel compassion for the person who
24 FLANNERY O'CONNOR, COLLECTED WORKS 817 (1998).
25 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2d ed. 1989). For a discussion of this
definition, its obsolescence but then recent revival by compassionate conservatism,
see Kathleen Woodward, Calculating Compassion, 77 IND. L.J. 223, 231-32, 242-43
(2002).
26 Lawrence Blum, Compassion, in THE VIRTUES: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON
MORAL CHARACTER 230 (Robert B. Kruschwitz & Robert C. Roberts eds., 1987).
27 Compassion, supra note 13, at 31.
28 Id. (referring to ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC, 1386a6-7).
29 Id. at 31-33.
30 Id. at 28. That compassion has both an affective and cognitive component has
been recognized by a number of scholars. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 14, at
1575-76. The compatibility or "interpenetration" of emotion and reason is readily
2003)
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has experienced some trivial loss, such as of a paper clip, or even
a serious loss if it is easily replaceable, even if that person
believes he suffers deeply. At the same time, we may feel
compassion for someone who has been deprived of an element of
human flourishing, such as education, even if he is unaware of
it.31 This judgment, the judgment of the observer as to the
existence and degree of suffering of the other person, is
accomplished through imagining the experiences of the other
person-how would I feel, the observer asks, if that happened to
me?3
2
Tying these elements of emotion and judgment together,
Blum defines compassion in the following manner: "[N]ot a
simple feeling-state but a complex emotional attitude toward
another, characteristically involving imaginative dwelling on the
condition of the other person, an active regard for his good, a
view of him as a fellow human being, and emotional responses of
a certain degree of intensity."33
Imaginative dwelling on the condition suffered by the other
person is a central component of compassion. We put ourselves
in the shoes of the person who is suffering and imagine what it
would be like to experience the same condition. This requires an
appreciation of the ways in which people are alike, the ways in
which they have an equal capacity to suffer and feel pain. "[T]he
other person's suffering (though not necessarily their particular
afflicting condition) is seen as the kind of thing that could
happen to anyone, including oneself insofar as one is a human
being."34 Compassion may also involve an element of fear, as the
observer not only imagines what it may be like to be in the
taken as a given by a significant body of recent scholarship, enabling the authors to
address interesting questions about the role of emotions in law other than the
longstanding question of the dichotomy between reason and the passions. See
Kathryn Abrams, The Progress of Passion, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1602, 1602 (2002)
(reviewing THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999)).
3:1 Compassion, supra note 13, at 31-32.
:12 Blum, supra note 26, at 230-31.
33 Id.at 231. Nussbaum tells us that compassion (though in this context, she
uses the term "pity" because she draws on Aristotle's work on pity) requires three
beliefs: "(1) the belief that the suffering is serious rather than trivial; (2) the belief
that the suffering was not caused primarily by the person's own culpable actions;
and (3) the belief that the pitier's own possibilities are similar to those of the
sufferer." Compassion, supra note 13, at 31.
:14 Blum, supra note 26, at 232.
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position of the person suffering but fears that she too may some
day suffer in the same manner.35
Appreciating the fact that a compassionate response follows
a recognition of the shared capacity to suffer and feel pain,
animal rights activists have long sought to elicit a compassionate
response from humans for animals by emphasizing that animals
feel pain just like people do. Peter Singer, for example, in his
well-known book Animal Liberation shows photographs of
animals who grimace and writhe with human-like expression
when subjected to a stimulus that would be painful to humans. 36
Along the same idea, someone who seeks to encourage others to
join in the poor treatment of a targeted individual or group will
do the opposite, portraying that individual or group as very
different from an accepted norm, often as other or less than
human. Much has been written about this phenomenon, for
example, in the history of the treatment of Jews by the Nazis
and the treatment of American blacks by Southern white
racists. 37
Some believe that the compassionate person suffers equally
with the object of compassion, as the word "compassion" literally
suggests. For example, Hannah Arendt writes that if you truly
feel compassion, you are in the shoes of another; you are equally
pained. 38 For most people, however, the imagined suffering of
another onto oneself does not mean that the compassionate
person truly suffers equally with the object of compassion. We
may transitorily or vicariously suffer like the other, but it is not
the actual suffering experienced by the person who is the object
of compassion. 39
Because compassion embodies notions of shared human
suffering, it is generally viewed as a moral response superior to
pity:
35 Compassion, supra note 13, at 36.
36 PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 8 (2d ed. 1990) ("If a being suffers there
can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.
No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its
suffering be counted equally with the like suffering ... of any other being.").
37 See, e.g., JESSIE DANIELS, WHITE LIES (1997).
38 ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, FRUITS OF SORROW: FRAMING OUR ATTENTION TO
SUFFERING 62-68 (1997).
, 9 See Blum, supra note 26, at 231 (insisting on importance of maintaining
distinction between subject and object of compassion); Compassion, supra note 13,
at 35 ("If one really had the experience of feeling pain in one's own body, then one
would precisely have failed to comprehend the pain of another as other.").
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This way of viewing the other person contrasts with the
attitude characteristic of pity, in which one holds oneself apart
from the afflicted person and from their suffering thinking of it
as something that defines that person as fundamentally
different from oneself. In this way the other person's condition
is taken as given whereas in compassion the person's affliction
is seen as deviating from the general conditions of human
flourishing. That is why pity (unlike compassion) involves a
kind of condescension, and why compassion is morally superior
to pity.4
0
Pity, then, is a response inferior to compassion because it
may allow the subject to view the object of pity with
condescension. Rather than acknowledging the shared
humanity of the subject and the object, pity appears to allow the
subject to feel superior to the object. The condition of the
sufferer is the focus of the compassionate person's concern; 4' by
focusing on the condition as unfortunate, rather than the person
as unfortunate, compassion remains true to the equal valuation
of all persons. Lawrence Blum writes:
Because compassion involves a sense of shared humanity, it
promotes the experience of equality, even when accompanied by
an acknowledgment of actual social inequality. Compassion
forbids regarding social inequality as establishing human
inequality. This is part of the moral force of compassion: by
transcending the recognition of social inequality, it promotes
the sensed experience of equality in common humanity.42
Thus, whereas pity permits distance from and
condenscension toward the person who is the object of pity,
compassion is thought to bring the subject and object of
compassion together in their shared human vulnerability.
To sum up, compassion appears to be understood generally
as a complex emotional response regarding the suffering of
another person, a response that has the following characteristics:
It generally involves imaginative dwelling on the other person's
suffering-wondering what it would be like to be in that
condition-it avoids an assumption of superiority by
appreciating the shared humanity of all persons by the subject
recognizing that the condition experienced by the sufferer could
40 Blum, supra note 26, at 232-33.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 233.
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also be experienced by the subject-"this could happen to
me"--or those she loves, and there is, in Blum's words, "an active
regard for [the sufferer's] good,"43 or, in other words, the
observer's experience of compassion serves to prompt a desire to
help.
B. Problems with Compassion
Yet compassion can just as easily lead to injustice, misery,
and disregard at the hands of the timid, the selfish, and even the
well-meaning. In this section, I discuss the three major
weaknesses of compassion: the element of imaginative dwelling,
the assumption of equality between observer and sufferer, and
the lack of any requirement of actual responsibility. During this
critique, I draw indirectly from the work of Emmanuel Levinas.
In the next part of this Article, I will more explicitly refer to
Levinas's work for the ways in which it might be used to
construct an alternative model of a caring response to the
situation of another person that does not disappoint our
expectations about the kind of care and respect due the person
who suffers.
1. Imaginative Dwelling
Compassion, "suffering with," suggests that when we are
with people for whom we feel compassion we in a sense suffer as
they suffer, we suffer along with them. How do we suffer as they
suffer, when we are not feeling the actual pain or grief or
deprivation? The common answer to this is that we can imagine
ourselves in that situation. Thus, we may not feel compassion
for a bug that is squashed because we do not believe bugs have a
nervous system as advanced as ours that can feel pain as we feel
pain. On the other hand, we know that another person, unless
he is paralyzed or sedated or in some other unusual condition,
will feel physical pain in certain instances because we also know
we would feel pain in that instance. Likewise with respect to
mental suffering, we know that a person would feel grief over the
loss of a loved one because we would feel such grief if we lost a
loved one. Our shared humanity allows us to feel the suffering of
others-to have compassion.
4.3 Blum, supra note 26, at 231.
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a. Compassion Risks Presumptuousness
A significant objection to this imaginative dwelling is often
expressed in your run-of-the-mill made-for-television movie,
where the caring person sympathetically says, "I know how you
feel," and the person who is suffering protests angrily, tearfully,
and usually with justification, "No, you don't; how could you?"
We are either terribly naive or, worse, unthinkingly
presumptuous, if we think that we know how the other person
feels or that we even transitorily or vicariously experience or
share in the suffering of the other person. Too often, what seems
like sharing is actually presuming, presuming that we can know
what another experiences when we are not that person and when
we may never have experienced anything similar.
On a recent trip to South Africa, I visited with an elderly
woman living in Soweto. Her 100 square foot home, crowded in
with many others just like it, was made of salvaged materials of
corrugated metal with a dirt floor, no running water, no toilet,
little light, and many flies. She shared it with two children. She
tried to make a little money through sewing. In recent times,
she had almost daily heard gun shots on the nearby road. I
realized, as I listened to her tell about her life now and under
apartheid, that as a middle-aged, middle-class, educated,
professional American white woman, I had no idea what it would
be like to be in her situation. I could listen and attempt to
understand, but I could not really understand. I could not know
and feel her experience. We were in no way sharing this
experience; it was her experience. I gave her some money. That
didn't feel very good either. If there were any true generosity
involved, it was on her part and not mine, in opening her home
to me.
The appreciation that imagination fails does not mean that
we should never attempt to understand by imagining.
Imagining may help us get closer to understanding, and
understanding guides us toward right actions. Martha
Nussbaum has urged policymakers and judges and other people
who can determine or influence the kind of lives others will live
to read literature because in reading good literature an
individual loses himself in the experience of the characters, if
only momentarily. 44 In reading novels, according to Nussbaum,
44 See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 13.
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the reader "imagine[s] what it is like to live the life of another
person who might, given changes in circumstance, be oneself or
one of one's loved ones."4 5 That improved understanding informs
our judgment.46
I do not want to discount the value of broadening our
understanding and empathetic abilities through reading.
Getting closer to understanding and appreciating the
experiences of another through reading and learning about their
stories is to be encouraged. Nussbaum has made a powerful case
that it may help us to fulfill our responsibilities toward others.
Yet, clearly, we wouldn't think it appropriate to say to the
woman in Soweto, "I know how you feel because I read about
something similar in a book." Compassion through imaginative
dwelling seems uncomfortably close to that sentiment and is a
response we must guard against.
Moreover, while literature or art may cause us to feel
despair or suffering in a way that deepens our knowledge of
despair or suffering, we must acknowledge that it does so in a
way that carries little or no risk, and the transitory nature of
those feelings of sorrow or grief or suffering when reading a sad
story or watching a sad movie too closely mirrors the transitory
nature of our feelings of compassion when we encounter someone
who is suffering.47
1,5 Id. at 5. Nussbaum writes: "Literature focuses on the possible, inviting its
readers to wonder about themselves." Id.
[G]ood literature is disturbing in a way that history and social science
writing frequently are not. Because it summons powerful emotions, it
disconcerts and puzzles. It inspires distrust of conventional pieties and
exacts a frequently painful confrontation with one's own thoughts and
intentions. One may be told many things about people in one's own society
and yet keep that knowledge at a distance. Literary works that promote
identification and emotional reaction cut through those self-protective
stratagems, requiring us to see and to respond to many things that may be
difficult to confront-and they make this process palatable by giving us
pleasure in the very act of confrontation.
Id. at 5-6.
46 Id. at 12. Nussbaum makes two important claims for the reader's experience:
"first, that it provides insights that should play a role (though not as uncriticized
foundations) in the construction of an adequate moral and political theory; second,
that it develops moral capacities without which citizens will not succeed in making
reality out of the normative conclusions of any moral or political theory, however
excellent." Id.
47 See Lauren G. Berlant, Poor Eliza, 70 AM. LITERATURE 635, 641 (1998)
(expressing concern that scenes of suffering in sentimental narratives do not call us
to action but instead return us to a private world of passivity).
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In addition, there may be problems both with
authenticity-the author or artist may be portraying a situation
or condition that she does not have adequate knowledge of-and
with universality-while the character in the book, film, or
picture may be experiencing a situation or condition as suffering,
that may not be a common experience, and in any event, cannot
be considered a universal experience. In a 1987 article, Paul
Longmore pointed out the inaccuracies and biases that
characterized current films and plays that dramatized issues of
assisted suicide.48 According to Longmore, in the play and movie
"Whose Life Is It Anyway?" a man paralyzed by a spinal cord
injury inaccurately believes he is completely incapacitated
sexually; his physicians do not correct this misimpression either
for the character or the audience. 49 The man is shown in a
wheelchair pushed by another person, rather than in a motorized
wheelchair that would allow him more independence. 50 "This
cavalier disregard of the facts of disability, so characteristic of
the advocates of assisted suicide, helps the storyteller persuade
the audience that severely physically disabled people are
helpless and hopeless."51 The main character calls himself a
"vegetable" and "not a man" and, like the severely disabled
characters in other dramatizations, pleads for assisted suicide. 52
As Longmore explains, in stories such as this:
[Dlisability means loss of self-control and self-determination,
loss of one's humanity, and separation from the human
community-in other words, social death. This is the inevitable
consequence of a major physical disability. It does not result
from discrimination or inaccessibility .... Stacking the deck,
48 See Longmore, supra note 18, at 150-52. See generally Adam A. Milani,
Better Off Dead than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a "Wrongful Living" Cause
of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients' Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 149 (1997) (discussing such popular depictions of disability as evidence
of societal prejudice that must be considered when evaluating the wisdom of
recognizing a tort of wrongful living).
49 Longmore, supra note 18, at 151. Another example Longmore gives is of a
postpolio quadriplegic man in the stage drama "Nevis Mountain Dew" who
complains about his lost sensory feeling, bladder control, and sexual function, none
of which result from polio. Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
[Vol.77:445
A CALL FOR RADICAL RESPONSIBILITY
these dramas manipulate viewers to accept death as the only
reasonable and merciful solution.53
Thus, one of the things we must guard against in our
feelings of compassion and the actions we take on the basis of
them is that we may inaccurately judge the degree and nature of
the suffering of another person. We know, for example, that
able-bodied people consistently overestimate the degree of
suffering of persons with disabilities. 5 4 The inability to truly
understand the suffering of other people means that this route to
ethical action--compassion through imaginative dwelling-is not
sufficient. Our ethical responsibility towards other people must
stem from and its contours be shaped by something other than,
or additional to, a response to their condition as we imagine it to
be experienced.
b. Compassion Risks Appropriating the Suffering of Another
Imaginative dwelling also demands that when we do try to
imagine the suffering of the other person, we imagine the events
53 Id. at 151-52.
54 National Council on Disability, Assisted Suicide: A Disability Perspective, 14
ISSUES L. & MED. 273 (1998) (position paper drafted for the National Council on
Disability by Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr.). This paper, in challenging various
misconceptions about the negative aspects of disability, notes that Americans with
disabilities are just as likely to be married as those without disabilities although the
expectation is often otherwise. Id. at 286. Likewise, people with disabilities do not
consider their disability to have much impact on their ability to have children or
their interest in doing so. Id.; see also Marsha Saxton, Prenatal Screening and
Discriminatory Attitudes About Disability, 13 WOMEN & HEALTH 217, 222 (1987).
Saxton, a person with spina bifida and a former director of a center for persons with
disabilities, notes that:
[J]ust as the larger population, some of these individuals experience
considerable difficulty in their lives while others do fine, have jobs, and
enjoy a full and satisfying life with friends and family.... As a group,
people with disabilities do not 'suffer' any more than any other group or
category of humans. Our limitations may be more outwardly visible, our
need for help more apparent, but like anybody else, the 'suffering' we may
experience is primarily a result of not enough human caring, acceptance,
and respect.
Id. at 221-22; see also HARLAN L. LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING
THE DEAF COMMUNITY (1992). Lane writes:
What is unforgivable [to hearing people] is that members of the deaf
community insist they are fine-for example, two-thirds of deaf adults
interviewed in a 1988 survey thought their social life was better than
hearing people's-when in fact we can give them a thousand reasons why
they can't be.
Id. at 9.
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or condition from which another suffers as happening to
ourselves. The focus leaves the other person and comes to the
self, or at least the focus is split between the other person and
the self. In a sense, we appropriate the other person's suffering.
Filtering the other's experience through our own selves (which
could include not only our selves as we are aware of them but
also the regions of our selves-fears, regrets, embarrassments,
losses-of which we are unaware) not only risks producing an
inaccurate calculation of the other person's suffering but also
creates a power over that person, a power of assumed
knowledge. 55
For example, under this understanding of compassion, a
person contemplating whether to assist in hastening the death of
another may ask himself, "Would I want to live that way?" Of
course, that is not the true question. The quality of the
compassionate person's life is not in question, and his continued
existence is not at risk. At the very least we must acknowledge
that that is not the question that should be asked when the
person seeking a hastened death is competent. Furthermore, it
also seems to be an inappropriate question when the person for
whom a hastened death is being considered is incompetent. In
that situation, the viewpoint of the competent person is so
completely and unalterably removed from the way the
incompetent person experiences the condition.
Compassion, in a way, is too easy. It does not require the
intense effort necessary to understand the needs and desires of
the suffering person as that person. Rather it suggests an
understanding of what your needs and desires would be if you
found yourself in that condition. What would you want? Of
course, you don't have to live with the actual consequences of the
5 See generally SPELMAN, supra note 38, at 113-32 (discussing the comparison
made by white suffragists of the nineteenth century to the experiences of African
American slaves). Spelman acknowledges that the experiences of others may be
appropriated in an exploitative way, but insists that the identification of the subject
with the object of compassion is important nonetheless.
[T]he paradox in appropriation reminds us that seeing one's own
experience in the experience of others can all too easily lend itself to the
expropriation of the experiences of others, to putting their experiences to
one's own use while erasing the fact of their having been subjects of those
experiences. But at the same time, our thinking of one another as possible
subjects of the same kinds of experiences can be an important piece of our
thinking of one another as members of the same human community.
Id. at 120-21.
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actions taken on the basis of this imaginative dwelling. Surely it
is easier to say that you would not want to continue living in a
certain condition if your life is not the one at stake. The State of
Oregon discovered this problem several years ago when it sought
to restructure its Medicaid eligibility and coverage rules.56 The
restructuring process included telephone polls of the state's
residents asking their opinions on the value of certain
treatments. 57 The healthy and able-bodied placed a low priority
on lifesaving medical assistance to people who had incurred a
serious physical disability, such as paraplegia. 58 When they
56 See generally Timothy B. Flanagan, ADA Analysis of the Oregon Health Care
Plan, 9 ISSUEs L. & MED. 397 (1994) (including several formerly unpublished
documents relating to the Oregon Medicaid proposal). Oregon, in 1989, approved a
plan to provide health care coverage to a larger number of people than at that time
were covered by the state's Medicaid program, but increasing the number of people
covered would require rationing some care. A commission was thus established to
prioritize individual health services, to list services " 'from the most important to
the least important.'" Id. at 397 (quoting Oregon Basic Health Care Act, ch. 836,
§ 4a(3), 1989 Or. Laws (enacting S.B. 27)). In any particular year Oregon's Medicaid
program would cover those services on the list above a line to correspond with
legislative appropriations. A waiver from the federal government was required for
this departure from Medicaid coverage rules. Initially, Oregon's proposed list of
prioritized treatments was compiled on the basis of express appraisals of the
"quality of life" of people following those various treatments. The Department of
Health and Human Services denied the waiver because it violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act. In a second attempt at creating a plan in compliance with the
ADA, the state compiled the list without the quality of life measurements of specific
conditions, but still downranked treatments that left individuals with symptomatic
conditions. Id. at 398. This revised plan was approved on the condition that a
reranking again take place that would not consider " 'whether treatment returned
an individual to an asymptomatic state.'" Id. at 399 (quoting Letter from William
Toby, Jr., Acting Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, to Kevin W. Concanon, Director,
Oregon Department of Human Resources (Mar. 19, 1993) (enclosing Health Care
Financing Administration Special Terms and Conditions)). Rationing that
discriminates against persons with disabilities can also take subtler forms, for
example, when treatment is denied on the basis of medical futility. See generally
Mary A. Crossley, Medical Futility and Disability Discrimination, 81 IOWA L. REV.
179 (1995) (assessing futility-based rationing schemes under the Americans with
Disabilities Act).
57 Flanagan, supra note 56, at 401-02.
58 The National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc.,
explained how the proposal would have discriminated against people with
disabilities in a letter to Representative Christopher Smith, published in a volume
of Issues in Law and Medicine:
Patient A and Patient B are both injured in an accident. Treatment A is
recommended for Patient A, while Treatment B is recommended for
Patient B. Both treatments cost the same. However, Treatment A will
sustain Patient A's life but will not restore the abilities A has lost after the
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imagined themselves suffering a severe loss of capabilities, they
imagined that they would not want to continue living. People
living with such severe disabilities quite naturally thought
differently; they indeed did value the medical and other
assistance necessary for continued life. 59
Compassion understood this way, where we try to imagine
the experience of another as happening to us, seems to ignore
what we know about the transformative effect of certain life
experiences. We know, for example, that many people who prior
to becoming disabled, insisted that they would not want to live if
disabled in the way they eventually were disabled, changed their
minds and want to continue living. Similarly, when people are
young and healthy, they do not think that expensive medical
treatments should be used to prolong their lives when they reach
their elderly years, yet the elderly seek these treatments.
Rebecca Dresser, John Robertson, and others have focused
needed attention on this important question of transformation
through illness or disability by asking what should guide
decision making in the event of a substantial and permanent
transformation from competency to incompetency.60 Should the
desires of the person expressed prior to incompetency be
accident (such as the ability to walk), while Treatment B will sustain B's
life and restore his ability to walk. If the basis for funding B but not A is a
quality of life judgment that being able to walk is of greater benefit than
not being able to walk, for example, then a decision to deny treatment for
A would be discrimination based on A's resulting level of disability. In
effect, B's life would be considered more valuable than A's life because B
will regain an additional function, while A would not. Under [this]
scenario, a distinction between two effective treatments would be based
not on treatment effectiveness, because both treatments would sustain life,
but on an inappropriate assessment of the underlying quality of life each
patient will have after treatment. This scenario describes the Oregon Plan.
Id. at 405-06.
" See id.
6o See, e.g., Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Qualify of Life and Non-
Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach,
17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 234, 236-37 (1989). Dresser and Robertson write:
When people become incompetent and seriously ill .... their interests may
radically change. With their reduced mental and physical capacities, what
was once of extreme importance to them no longer matters, while things
that were previously of little moment assume much greater significance.
An existence that seems demeaning and unacceptable to the competent
person may still be of value to the incompetent patient, whose abilities,
desires and interests have so greatly narrowed.
Id. at 236; see also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 302-06 (1984)
(explaining that a person's life may be a series of identities, or successive selves).
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respected, or does that person in a sense no longer exist and
another person stand before us? Does it make sense to
distinguish between the then person and the now person?
Looking to imaginative dwelling to answer how to ethically
respond to someone else's situation denies our growing
awareness of the transformative effect of changing
circumstances and conditions.
Finally, we must wonder whether this imagining response
contributes to fears that fuel prejudicial attitudes. As explained
above, scholars often describe the experience of compassion as
involving an element of fear, due to the sudden awareness that
the unfortunate condition could also happen to the person
observing it.61 Fear is a common response to people with severe
disabilities. According to a 1991 poll, forty-seven percent of
respondents said they reacted with fear when they met people
with severe disabilities "'because what happened to the disabled
person might happen to them."'6 2  As Paul Steven Miller,
commissioner of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, has written, "Many able-bodied persons are
tremendously fearful about becoming disabled. This fear is
based upon the notion that a disabled person's life is inferior to,
and less precious than, an able-bodied person's life."63 According
to Miller, this fear is a primary source of prejudice against
persons with disabilities. 64 To the extent that a compassionate
response involves fear, it may have the unfortunate and
unintended effect of contributing to prejudice. 65
c. Compassion May 'Thematize" the Person Who Suffers
Compassion has been praised for focusing on the
unfortunate condition rather than on the unfortunate person. 66
61 See supra text accompanying note 32.
62 Milani, supra note 48, at 202 n.247 (citing and quoting JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO,
No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 328
(1993)).
6: Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with
Disabilities-Is It a Right Without Freedom?, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 47, 49 (1993).
,4 Id. at 48-49.
65 See Longmore, supra note 18, at 141-42 (stating that the "unacknowledged
and unconscious fear and prejudice of many nonhandicapped persons toward people
with disabilities" at times "burst out in violent words and deeds, but usually, and
perhaps even more dangerously, they are masked by an avowed compassion,
contempt cloaking itself in paternalism").
66 See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
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This is seen as laudable because persons are not thereby
discounted, devalued, or dismissed, but are still seen as equally
deserving of respect and attention. Put this way, focusing on the
condition does seem preferable to focusing on the person; it's
better than pity. On the other hand, however, focusing on the
condition carries the risk of what Levinas calls "them atization."6 7
If the condition stands in for the person in evoking the right
ethical response, i.e., compassion, then the condition may stand
in for the person in other respects as well. In other words, the
condition is the person, and thus we need to know nothing more
about the person than the existence of the condition. Indeed,
this is one of the central criticisms scholars like Adrienne Asch,
Eric Parens, and others within the "disability rights" critique of
prenatal genetic testing make of current practices of genetic
screening and abortion.68  These scholars object that when
decisions are made to abort a fetus on the basis of a positive
diagnosis of, for example, Down syndrome, the condition, Down
syndrome, stands in for the entire person who would have been
born.69 Nothing else is known about the potential child except
this one quality. We know nothing about her preferences, her
dreams, her actual abilities or disabilities, or her capacity to love
and be loved. Instead, she has been essentialized, or thematized,
into a single attribute.
The risk of thematization is especially high in situations of
disability, old age, or the loss of certain bodily functions. These
are also often the conditions that are involved in situations in
which the hastening of someone's death is contemplated. In
much of the literature about the rights of persons to hasten their
deaths, and indeed the legal cases that have addressed the topic,
67 EMMANUEL LEVINAS, OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE 6, 153
(1981).
68 See Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal
Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, 29 no.5 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 51,
525 (Special Supp. 1999).
69 Id. at S2, $5-$6. Michael Berube's book about his son Jamie, a child with
Down syndrome, provides a compelling counterpoint to this societal inclination to
categorize and thematize people with disabilities. He writes:
I have tried. Almost as a form of emotional exercise, I have tried, on
occasion, to step back and see him as others might see him, as an instance
of a category, one item on the long list of human subgroups. This is a child
with Down syndrome I say to myself. This is a child with a developmental
disability. It never works: Jamie remains Jamie to me.
MICHAEL BERUBE, LIFE AS WE KNOW IT xi-xii (1998).
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a dependency on others for toileting needs takes on unparalleled
importance.70  Lack of independent toileting appears to be
equated with a person who lacks dignity. Furthermore, a life
without dignity is often translated into a life not worth living.
This, however, ignores the fact that elderly people near death,
even suffering from dementia, may still find pleasure in visiting
with relatives, in having their hair brushed, having lotion
rubbed into their hands, rediscovering long lost childhood
memories. Instead, the tendency is to focus only on the inability
of such people to use the bathroom by themselves.7'
A compassionate response that focuses on the condition of a
person in a way that permits us to see her in terms of a theme
can result in unfair prejudice and discrimination. Even when
less noxious results follow, such a response inappropriately
shortcuts the more intense inquiry that is required to determine
the needs and desires of that individual and can prevent the
ethical response that is due. As we all know, sometimes a
compassionate response is offered to a person who is not actually
suffering, but whose condition has simply been traditionally
understood as equated with suffering. Indeed, Marsha Saxton
tells us that on the whole people with disabilities do not suffer
any more than people without disabilities.72  For example,
studies show that deaf people, on the whole, live happier lives
than hearing people.73 When people with disabilities do suffer, it
is often not from their physical impairment but from the societal
reaction to that impairment-whether of indifference or
discrimination or disparagement. A compassionate response
that thematizes a person as disabled can cause an
70 See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
71 And if we do, I submit, they do. One of the top reasons listed by people who
seek to hasten their deaths through physician assistance is losing control of their
bodily functions. See Off. Disease Prevention & Epidemiology, Or. Dep't. Hum.
Servs., Fifth Annual Report on Oregon's Death with Dignity Act 20 (2003)
(compiling results of interviews with physicians prescribing lethal medications
under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act; while physicians listed multiple end-of-life
concerns that may have contributed to patients' requests for lethal medication, one
of the most frequently reported concerns was losing control of bodily functions (fifty-
eight percent of the patients who died after ingesting a lethal dose of medication in
the years 1998-2001 were identified by physicians as being motivated in part by this
concern)).
72 Saxton, supra note 54, at 222.
7:1 See LANE, supra note 54, at 9; see also NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra
note 54, at 284-86.
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underestimation of what that person can achieve and can
thereby cut off opportunities for success, expression, respect, and
self-worth. It can also result in alienation of people with
disabilities as others cannot see beyond the apparent physical
condition. The emphasis that advocates for people with
disabilities place on language captures this concern that the
focus of attention is properly placed on the person rather than
the condition; advocates encourage the use of terms such as
"person with a disability" rather than "the disabled person" so
that the person comes first.
d. Whose Suffering Is Being Relieved?
Finally, if we are actually successful in imagining the
suffering of the other person, so accurately that we too suffer,
then to the extent our imagining is causing us to "suffer with,"
we might be trying to relieve our own actual, although vicarious,
suffering rather than the other person's. This, too, has especially
troubling consequences for situations in which the hastening of
someone's death might be contemplated. To the extent that it
pains us to see and, upon seeing to imagine the experience for
ourselves of another person-such as a person with severe
disabilities or an elderly person with Alzheimer's Disease-then
actions we might take to assist in hastening their death appear
to be for the self, rather than the other person-or at the least
the motives are mixed, which is troubling in itself.74
One of my criticisms of advocacy on behalf of a right to
physician assisted suicide is that it seems facile to think of any
purported right to assisted suicide to be based in autonomy, for
the action of two rather than one is required by definition.75
Understanding that the action of two is required brings home
74 See Compassion, supra note 13, at 32-35. Martha Nussbaum acknowledges
that there is a debate in the traditional work on compassion about how the process
of identifying with the sufferer actually works. Thus she points out that certain
passages from Adam Smith's work that suggest that a compassionate observer
actually does, at the time he feels compassion, believe that he is the sufferer, and
points to the work of Arthur Schopenhauer which suggests that the compassionate
observer's responses are "fused in some mysterious way with those of the sufferer."
Id. She rejects these views, arguing that a compassionate observer is always aware
of his "separateness from the sufferer." Id. Otherwise, "If one really had the
experience of feeling the pain in one's own body, then one would precisely have
failed to comprehend the pain of another as other." Id.
7, Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 103, 119-26 (1996).
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the fact that the opinion of the assistant in death regarding the
experience of the suffering of the other is critically important
and is, in fact, the linchpin. The assistant in death must believe
that the other person's suffering is so awful that suicide is the
answer. 76 If the assistant experiences suffering by her contact
with the other person, by seeing or caring for that person, then
the action of two is not simply relying on the opinion of two
about the depth of the person's suffering but also the experience
of two who are suffering, the person seeking death, and the
person who is asked to assist in it. The suffering of the
assistant, then, rather than the suffering of the ill person can
have a determinative effect on the answer given to a request for
assisted suicide.
2. Equality
a. Compassion Appears Based on a Sense of Equality That Is
False
As discussed above, compassion, which is considered good, is
often distinguished from pity, which is bad, because compassion
is based on a sense of the shared, common experience of being
76 Or, we might say, "rational." In fact, a Michigan Circuit Court in Michigan v.
Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1993), rev'd 527
N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), held that criminalizing physician-assisted suicide was
unconstitutional because it violated a person's right to commit "rational" suicide,
suggesting that the decision is not entirely autonomous, but subject to review. Id. at
*18. The Court found "that when a person's quality of life is significantly impaired
by a medical condition ... causing the quality of life to be significantly impaired,
and the decision to end one's life is freely made without undue influence, such a
person has a constitutionally protected right to commit suicide." Id. at *19.
We also have to be aware that, without strict safeguards, physicians might be
the dominating actor in the pair. The power imbalance in the relationship between
physician and patient is well-documented. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD
OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 198-99 (1984); see also Bernard Lo, Improving Care Near
the End of Life: Why is it So Hard? 274 JAMA 1634, 1635 (1995) (revealing that only
41% of patients in a study reported discussing CPR or their prognosis with their
physicians; physicians misunderstood patients' preferences with respect to CPR in
80% of cases); Patricia Wesley, Dying Safely, 8 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 467, 480-85
(1993) (suggesting that Dr. Timothy Quill was not simply respecting his patient's
autonomy when providing her with a lethal prescription, but was a "powerful actor,"
injecting his own values into her medical decisions). The latter reference is to Dr.
Quill's now famous letter to the New England Journal of Medicine, in which he
described his assistance in a patient's suicide. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity:
A Case of Indiuidualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691, 691-94
(1991).
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human, whereas pity is the response of one who is distant and
superior. Yet it seems a mistake in many situations where one
is suffering to emphasize the equality of the persons involved.
Of course, at some very basic level the persons involved are, as
human beings, entitled to equal respect, but I think as a matter
of common usage, in the way we normally think about
compassion, we think of the compassionate response coming
from the stronger person, the person who, at the time in
question, has more resources-whether they be emotional,
financial, or physical-than the person who suffers. This can be
illustrated by the fact that we do not usually think of fellow
sufferers as having compassion for each other.
This inherent inequality that exists in our typical conception
of the situation in which compassion takes place was evident on
the walls of an elementary school I recently visited. The concept
of compassion in many debates and, in particular, the debate
over physician-assisted suicide entails no detailed or
philosophical definition for us, making it helpful to look at
common usage. I was interested in what the third-graders had
to say on their assignment labeled "compassion." They were
asked to fill in a four-square grid with a picture and a one
sentence description in each section of the grid describing a way
in which they had acted compassionately toward other people.
The most common situation depicted in the papers by far was
that of another child hurting himself and the author or artist
providing the other child with aid. This, to me, more than the
descriptions of scholars who might focus on the equality-basis of
compassion, captures what we mean in lay terms by compassion.
The relationship depicted is not one of equality; rather the one
person who is standing has the resources or ability to help the
other who has fallen down. This inequality is emphasized
because it is important with respect to the expectations for
action.77 Parenthetically, the relationship depicted is also not
one of shared suffering. The child rescuer was not feeling
equally bad as the child who was hurt. She might have felt sad
77 See supra text accompanying note 40. I appreciate the fact that when
Lawrence Blum, quoted above, speaks about the equality basis of compassion, he is
referring to the shared humanity of all and that he is not suggesting that
compassion suggests anything about social, financial, or physical inequality. At the
same time, my point here is that the inequality is what makes the situation so
commonly understood as ripe for compassion (one person should feel compassion for
the other), as much or more than the equal human status of both people.
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because the other child was hurting, but she did not seem to feel
the same kind of pain or feel it with the same intensity. There
was usually only one child crying in each picture, the child who
had fallen down. Sometimes the rescuer child was smiling in the
picture because she was able to help.
There is much that is positive flowing from the general
liberal philosophy that all humans are equal and that they are
entitled to equal rights and equal respect. But if the ethical
response toward people in need that we are going to hold as an
ideal is rooted in equality, then we may risk the subject's failure
to recognize her greater-not equal, but greater-ability to ease
the suffering of the person for whom compassion is felt. In other
words, emphasize equality too much and, in our society, it
becomes fend for yourself. We should, instead, want the subject
to understand how much more she has; to appreciate the fact
that she is not an equal sufferer, she does not truly "suffer with";
and she can do something to relieve the condition of the one who
does suffer.
b. Compassion as Based in Equality Is Inadequate
Thus, it appears that we want to recognize, or we want the
subject in a situation of compassion to recognize, that she has
greater resources by which to aid the suffering object of
compassion, but there is another way in which the emphasis
within scholarly circles on the equality basis of compassion is
problematic. Equality is inadequate to describe the relationship
of obligation that exists between two persons when one is
suffering and the other is not. Rather than a situation of
equality, we might instead see the suffering person as having an
unequal or greater claim for relief.
Suppose for a moment that we had a situation in which a
physician encounters a stranger who needs immediate life-
saving care. In responding to the need of the stranger, to this
stranger here and now, who stands or lies before the physician,
the physician must not accept as a fundamental tenet the
equality between himself and the patient. Rather he must
accept the priority of the patient. That recognition of the priority
of the patient means that the physician put his own interests
aside and provide the care that is needed.
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3. No Duty
Finally, compassion does not require acts of care. This is for
two reasons. First, compassion may not be experienced by the
subject in the situation where our moral intuition understands
that care should be given. Second, even if compassion is
experienced, it does not require any action on the basis of it.
Compassion may be a motivator, but it is not a master.
This failure of compassion can be seen by further
considering the physician who encounters the stranger needing
immediate care. This situation is one in which many of us would
believe the physician should provide care. In fact, the American
Medical Association has adopted a principle of medical ethics
that requires the physician to provide care in an emergency
situation.78 Yet relying on the emotional/ethical response of
compassion would not get us to the same place .as this principle
of medical ethics. Most obviously, the physician, even if he is a
good and caring individual, at the moment may not feel
compassion for the stranger. Perhaps he has a number of other
pressing matters on his mind. The emotional state required for
compassion may elude him at the moment. Similarly, he might
not be particularly inclined to like or respect this particular
stranger before her. Perhaps he cannot imagine himself in this
situation or this kind of emergency ever happening to him.
Secondly, even if he does feel compassion, that feeling does not
require him to act. Other feelings may compete within the
physician to make him turn away from the stranger.
It is not mere compassion that we seek from the physician; it
is action assumed upon acknowledgement of.an obligation. We
would not think the physician especially noble or philanthropic
to aid the stranger; we would think of him as bound to do so.
If we did not have this expectation, then we might see the
physician as only bound to that for which he has contracted.
This, indeed, is the law, even in the case of an emergency. 79 As a
78 "A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in
emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve .. " See Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics: Current
Opinions with Annotations, Chicago, Ill.: AMA, 1998, Principle VI.
79 Generally, physicians have no duty to treat an individual with whom they
are not in a physician-patient relationship. The relationship between physician and
patient has largely been defined as a contractual one. See, e.g., Oliver v. Brock, 342
So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1976) ("The relationship between a physician and patient may
result from an express or implied contract, either general or special, and the rights
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general matter, doctors are obligated to provide care only to
those to whom they have promised it.80 They may decide, if they
like, to take on certain patients out of compassion or
philanthropy, but they are not required to do so. The duties they
do assume may be assumed conditionally, such as the condition
of payment, which seems reasonable for most situations, but also
the condition of about anything, and services may be terminated
with adequate notice.8'
Under this legal system, a doctor may, for example, refuse to
provide care to pregnant women unless they agree to be
sterilized after delivery. The physician in the 1977 case of
Walker v. Pierce testified regarding his policy requiring women
who were incapable of self support to agree to voluntary
sterilization upon the birth of their third child or if they did not
wish to cede to that request, to require that they seek care
elsewhere.8 2 The court upheld the physician's right to condition
and liabilities of the parties thereto are governed by the general law of
contract .. "); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (finding that
physician's refusal to render aid to decedent not actionable; physician, by obtaining
state license, does not obligate himself to practice on any terms he does not choose
to accept); Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W. 2d 104, 106-07 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969) ("The
relation of physician and patient is contractual and wholly voluntary, created by
argument, express or implied."); see also WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE
LAW AND ETHICS 128-29 (5th ed.) (1998) (explaining that Hurley still represents the
prevailing law for physicians).
The existence of an emergency does not generally alter the legal right of the
physician to refuse treatment. See Karen M. Rothenberg, Who Cares?." The
Evolution of the Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 21, 25-33
(1989). Those few legal cases that have found an obligation on the part of physicians
to provide emergency care have found a contractual basis for doing so. The contract
is not one between the patient and the doctor, but between the doctor and the
medical care facility (for example, an agreement in which the physician agrees to be
on-call for an emergency room), see Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774, 777-78 (Ariz.
1980); Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W. 3d 42, 47-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), or between the
doctor and health maintenance organization (where the doctor has again agreed
with the organization to provide care in particular circumstances, see Hand v.
Tavera, 864 S.W.2d 678, 679-80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). Thus, even in emergencies,
the physician has a duty only insofar as he or she has ex ante voluntarily assumed
one, if not to the patient directly then to another party who undertakes (for a fee or
not) to provide care. No obligation to provide care devolves upon the physician as a
matter of course.
80 Again, excepting the professional but not legal obligation to provide care in
the case of emergencies.
81 See Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211-12 (Utah 1937) (explaining obligation of
continuing attention in the absence of reasonable notice of termination of
relationship).
2 560 F.2d 609, 611 (4th. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978).
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his delivery of a patient's fourth child on her agreement to be
sterilized.8 3 The court could "perceive no reason why Dr. Pierce
could not establish and pursue the policy he has publicly and
freely announced."8 4
This case does not appear to be an aberration with respect to
its statement of the law. Doctors may and have legally refuse
care to strangers in emergencies, to lawyers because they are
lawyers, to spouses of lawyers because they are spouses of
lawyers, and to lesbians and gays because of their sexual
orientation.85 Thankfully, most do not. They generally believe
they have an ethical responsibility, even though not a
contractual or legal responsibility, to provide care in emergencies
and to provide care without imposing inappropriate conditions.
This responsibility cannot be explained as compassion. Doctors
may or may not feel compassion for a particular stranger; and if
that is all they feel, they could turn away and deny the stranger
entry into the doctor-patient contract.Compassion is merely an overlay of contract. It is a
response voluntarily assumed--or not. Within the world of
R3 Id. at 613. The condition here was not imposed while the woman was in
active labor, so there was not the additional complication of a situation of duress or
need for immediate care. The plaintiff, Virgil Walker, was informed of the defendant
physician's policy of sterilization approximately four months before she delivered
her baby. Id. at 611.
84 Id. at 613. Not all conditions imposed by physicians for treatment receive
such disinterested approval. In another case, a court found that the condition
imposed was not acceptable. In Tunkl u. Regents, the court refused to enforce a
waiver of liability signed by a patient as a condition to receiving charitable care
from a research hospital. 383 P.2d 441, 442, 447 (Cal. 1963). The court ruled the
release unenforceable because the release condition varied the legal standard of
care owed to patients and was thus an unacceptable "exculpatory clause." Id. The
court did not reject the condition at issue in Tunkl because of any particular distaste
for the idea that a physician can impose conditions upon a patient for either the
beginning or continuation of care.' Such ability is a natural consequence of the "no
duty" rule, and if courts were to scrutinize conditions as a general matter, the "no
duty" rule would be directly assailed. See id.
85 See Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774, 776 (Ariz. 1980) (stating that evidence
suggested that refusal of on call physician in emergency room to see patient arriving
in semi-comatose condition was due to personal animosity toward the patient or to
the fact that the patient's husband was a lawyer); Jane E. Allen, Invisible Women;
Many Lesbians Avoid Doctors for Fear of a Backlash from Judgmental Practitioners,
L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1999, at Sl(relating experiences of lesbian women). See
generally MICHELE ELIASON, WHO CARES: INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO HEALTH
CARE FOR LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL PERSONS (NLN Press 1996) (describing
numerous studies that document negative attitudes towards gays and lesbians
among health care providers).
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contract, the response of compassion may be put on like a
physician's white coat or not. Compassion, like contractual
obligations, may be conditional; it may be conditioned on the
appearance of the stranger, on her number of children; on her
financial capacity; on her sexual orientation; and even on her
gender, skin color, race, ethnicity, religion, or disability-all
factors that may cause identification with the suffering person to
be more attenuated.
If we look no further than compassion to determine our
duties to one another, then we seek no more than contract. We
assume that everyone is equal and has the equal ability to enter
into contracts for his benefit. No one has a greater claim; no one
has a greater responsibility. By contrast, an ethics of radical
responsibility, to which I now turn, means that whether or not I
feel compassion for the other person I have a responsibility for
another's suffering. 86 Responsibility does not have the voluntary
nature of compassion.
II. AN ETHICS OF RADICAL RESPONSIBILITY
Levinas, a Holocaust survivor, philosopher, and theologian, 87
finds the condition of ethics to be in the originary, primordial,
8N And how is such responsibility justified? For Levinas, as we will see below, it
is not directly or simply justified by the needs of the stranger. It is acknowledged
instead as an essential part of being human, of existing. This may be more apparent
in the case of physicians and their patients than in other relationships. For it is for
physicians the stranger, who may or may not have any particular qualities of
endearment or interest, that is essential for the physician's existence, that provides
the basis for the physician's existence. The physician's existence depends upon the
stranger or patient calling for healing or comfort. William F. May tells us that a
physician needs his patients for his own professional and emotional well-being: "No
one can watch a physician nervously approach retirement without realizing how
much he has needed his patients to be himself." William F. May, Code, Covenant,
Contract, or Philanthropy, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Dec. 1975 at 29, 33. Their acts of
care are not the gifts of a philanthropist but the responsibility of an obligor.
87 Adriaan Peperzak explains that while Levinas has also written what might
more properly be considered theological works, his philosophical works are pure
philosophy and do not stand on a religious basis. See PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at
210. Peperzak writes:
The stress that Levinas lays on morality and religion has caused some
misunderstandings. Some readers consider his philosophy to be too pious
or even to be a sort of theology. Yet few contemporary philosophers have
criticized the praxis and the idea of traditional theology more radically
than has Levinas; and, although no philosophy can or may free itself from
its prephilosophical, and therefore naive, convictions, Levinas has stressed
more than once the fact that he is not a theologian but a philosopher ....
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face-to-face encounter between two human beings.88 When we
look into the face of another person, we are compelled to respond,
whether with a smile, a gesture of greeting, an invitation, an
apology, a helping hand, pity, mercy, a cold stare, a deliberate
disregard, or an angry glare. We cannot avoid some response,
Levinas tells us, even if it is the response of indifference; a
response of indifference is a response. We are trapped, captured,
"held hostage" by the face of another person whose presence
commands some response. 89 The command to respond to the face
of another person comes before everything else, before the
subject's knowledge of himself, even before the subject's own
existence or "beingness." For this reason, Levinas considers
ethics as "first philosophy," prior to the philosophy of ontology,
the study of being; rather than the "I" coming first and
knowledge and relations with others coming second, it is only the
presence of others that allows the "I" or the "subject" to exist.90
Other people and their needs, their claims on us, and our
responses, determine who we actually are. For Levinas, those
claims must be answered rather than ignored; actions taken in
generous response to other people is what constitutes the human
being.9'
Id.
88 EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY 35-40 (Alphonso Lingis trans.,
1969) [hereinafter TOTALITY AND INFINITY].
89 Levinas writes:
A human being is the sole being which I am unable to encounter without
expressing this very encounter to him. It is precisely in this that the
encounter distinguishes itself from knowledge. In every attitude in regard
to the human there is a greeting-if only in the refusal of greeting.
Emmanuel Levinas, Is Ontology Fundamental?, in EMMANUEL LEVINAS, BASIC
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 1, 7 (Adriaan T. Peperzak et al. eds., 1996).
90 TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 43-48. It is important to mention
that "the other," for Levinas does not mean a marginalized group. Common
references in current legal scholarship to "the other" or "otherness," or "othering"
are used to criticize the ways in which practices, laws, or legal decisions treat some
people as different (and inferior) from some norm in a way that leads to unjustified
and therefore unfair discrimination. Whether used by liberal or critical scholars, the
focus seems to be on greater comprehension of the "other" or the "outsider" in order
that he might be treated equally with members of the majority group. The liberal
project does this by assimilation, pointing out the similarities between the other and
the normative group, while the critical project recognizes and sometimes celebrates
the differences between them but appeals to equal respect for all just the same.
Neither generally emphasizes how an experience with the "other" in order to be
genuinely ethical must alter the subject, or the normative group. Nor does either
generally insist on the subject's responsibility to the other person.
91 For Levinas, "being human is a concrete and physical sensitivity to the
[Vol.77:445
A CALL FOR RADICAL RESPONSIBILITY
In this part of the Article, I draw on the work of Emmanuel
Levinas to construct an alternative to the compassionate
response, one that shares with compassion a concern and care
for others, but that avoids some of compassion's weaknesses.
This alternative I call an "ethics of radical responsibility."
Levinas's work does not provide a system of principles or rules
that might apply to a given situation, but suggests instead an
orientation. It is an orientation in which the other person takes
precedence or priority over the subject. Indeed, if rules or
principles could be derived from this orientation, they could not
possibly be fulfilled because at essence the orientation is that
expressed by Dostoevsky when he claims responsibility for
everything and everyone. One approach in studying Levinas's
work for the insights that might be found there regarding
questions of social policy, justice, and law, is to consider in what
ways the orientation he describes presents a challenge or
interruption to existing practices and norms. In the following
sections I identify four central concepts found in Levinas's work
that bear on the ethical relationship between persons and that
have particular relevance to the relationship between a subject
and another person who suffers-the situation we commonly
think of as appropriate for compassion. These four concepts are
welcome, alterity, rupture, and responsibility.
A. Welcome or Desire
"A flock of wild geese had settled to rest on a pond. One of the
flock had been captured by a gardener, who had clipped its
wings before releasing it. When the geese started to resume
their flight, this one tried frantically, but vainly, to lift itself
into the air. The others, observing his struggles, flew about in
obvious efforts to encourage him; but it was no use. Thereupon,
the entire flock settled back on the pond and waited, even
though the urge to go on was strong within them. For several
days they waited until the damaged feather had grown
sufficiently to permit the goose to fly. Meanwhile, the unethical
gardener, having been converted by the ethical geese, gladly
claims revealed by the Other, a being-delivered to the Other and a substitute."
PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 26, Peperzak also explains, "The Other's existence
reveals to me the uniqueness of a task that constitutes the meaning of my life." Id.
at 28.
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watched them as they finally rose together, and all resumed
their long flight. 9
2
For Levinas, the subject exists only because of and for the
other. The expression "I" means "here I am," for you. 93 One of
the ways "I" can be "here for you" is to welcome you into my
home, to sit at my table, into my life.94 Welcome, however, is not
merely being a good host. A good host may have invited a guest
grudgingly, out of mere obligation, such as the heavy-drinking
spouse of a good friend or the host's boss. Such tolerance is not
sufficient; ethics begin with an orientation of true welcome, of
true desire for the presence of the other person. 95
This orientation of welcome is especially insightful when it
is considered in challenge to, or interruption of, current social
attitudes and practices toward people with disabilities, who often
feel unwelcomed-and not without justification. When a person
who uses a wheelchair is confronted with stairs as his only
92 ALBERT SCHWEITZER, REVERENCE FOR LIFE 48 (Thomas Kiernan ed., 1965).
93 EMMANUEL LEVINAS, OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE 114
(Alphonso Lingis trans., 1981). Levinas writes, "The word I means here I am,
answering for everything and for everyone." Id.
94 TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 77. According to Peperzak:
I must feed my body and arrange my house in order to receive the
foreigner knocking at my door; if I possess a home, it is not for me alone.
Expressions such as 'After you' or 'Make yourself at home' say quite well
that the person who enters is respected as Other. 'Here I am' does not,
then, signify that I am the most important being of the world but, on the
contrary, that I am at your disposal.
PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 24-25.
95 TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 33-52. Levinas sees in the face-to-
face relationship, between an "I" and a stranger, the experience of desire. Human
desire (not need, which may be for necessities such as food, but desire) is a desire for
that which is absolutely other than itself, for something that cannot be contained by
it, for something that cannot even be comprehended, for something beyond any idea
or concept we can have of it, something that "overflows" its idea; it is a desire for the
"infinite," which for Descartes meant "God," but for Levinas means the human
other. He finds the originary face-to-face relationship between two individuals to be
the situation in which that desire appears.
The relationship between an "I" and another person is grounded in language,
and when one speaks, one gives oneself over to the other. Thus, the original social
relation is not one of knowledge of the other, comprehension and therefore
assimilation and possession, but of speaking to him. And the expression of speech
invites its return. "To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his
expression." Id. at 51. The lost memory of the originary encounter with the other
does not reveal a relation between individuals where each is primarily concerned
with protection of his or her own freedom, a concern that leads to resistance and
ultimately war, but a radically different relation, one of welcome, hospitality, and
generosity. Id.; see also PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 30-31, 120-30.
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access inside a building, he is not to be faulted for believing his
presence is not welcomed. As some writers have well pointed
out, people with disabilities often suffer more from the lack of
welcome, respect, and care that they experience rather than from
their actual impairments. 96 In fact, it has taken a statute,
imperfectly, the Americans with Disabilities Act 97 to force the
able-bodied community to act as if they welcome people with
disabilities into a full and equal participation within the
community.
It is not, however, the outward manifestations of welcome,
as it is not the mere invitation to the dinner party, that satisfy
the orientation of welcome within the ethics of radical
responsibility. It is not sufficient to engage in welcoming
behavior as a solution to the alienation that people with
disabilities sometimes experience. Taking up the welcoming
banner may be sufficient under an ethics of compassion-the
response of welcoming behavior is chosen to alleviate the
condition of exclusion, in the same way that a painkiller may be
offered to alleviate pain. Such welcoming acts, however, do not
tell us that the existence of the person with a disability is
desired, just as the offer of a painkiller does not tell us that the
existence of the person in pain is desired. An ethics of radical
responsibility is based, at its root, in a desire for the other
person. The aim, therefore, is true desire, true welcome for the
other person. Mere acts of welcome that derive from compassion
prompted by someone's experience of alienation are not likely to
fool many into believing that a true welcome has been offered.
Thus, while not immediately obvious, compassionate
feelings toward another person do not necessarily, and may in
fact not, signal welcome or desire for another person. In fact,
compassion does not really tell us anything about how the
compassionate person feels about the suffering person's
96 See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing:
Contradictory or Compatible? 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 318 (2003) (discussing
that the "social model" of disability and "minority group model" of disability both, in
contrast to the traditional "medical model," do not "ascrib[e] the major difficulties of
people with disabilities to their physical, cognitive, or emotional make-up. Instead,
the theorists assert that the difficulties should be ascribed to the mismatch between
the range of people actually in the world and the institutional practices, physical
structures, modes of communication, and social attitudes that assume a much
narrower range of human beings than exist."); Saxton, supra note 54, at 222.
97 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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continued existence. The focus is not on welcoming the existence
of the suffering person or desiring interaction with him but is
instead on empathic feelings regarding the condition being
endured. One may in fact be indifferent to the presence or even
existence of the other person.
For example, it is possible to feel compassion for a person
who is suffering from a grave illness or severe disability but at
the same time lack the desire that such person be alive and in
the world-especially in my world where I have to encounter her
suffering. Of course, compassionate responses may militate
against the elimination of such a person because she does in fact
exist and have feelings, but that does not mean her presence is
welcomed or sought or desired.
The fact that compassionate responses to the living can be
consistent with, or at least not obviously antithetical to,
indifference to the existence of people with severe disabilities is
one thing. But what is more startling is that a compassionate
response to the condition of people with disabilities or serious
illness is often thought to justify the avoidance of the lives of
such people, or even to counsel the end of their lives for those
unfortunate enough to exist. Here I refer to prenatal screening
to avoid the births of children with disabilities and patterns of
advocacy for physician assisted suicide that consistently refer to
patients with severe disabilities as examples of candidates in
need of such practices. 98
Looking first at current and likely future prenatal screening
practices, it is in large part our imaginative dwelling on the kind
of life a potential child with a disability would have that leads us
to support selective abortion to avoid such lives.99 If they arrive,
911 As an example of the latter, Geoffrey Fieger, when he represented Jack
Kevorkian in defense of his acts of assisting suicide, cited Christopher Reeve as the
sort of patient his client would help commit suicide. Milani, supra note 48, at 199-
200 n.243.
99 Adrienne Asch, along with others, has pointed out how mistaken common
assumptions about life with a disability can be. In a recent article, she points out
that most people with prenatally detectable disabilities are not hindered from
leading fulfilling lives merely by virtue of the characteristics that distinguish them
from people without disabilities. See Asch, supra note 96, at 322-27. She also
directly addresses the question of the good of having a capacity and the presumptive
bad of not having it. Having a capacity may be good, she writes, "but the absence of
capacity is simply an absence." Id. at 326. It is not, for one thing, a "loss" (as might
be experienced by someone who had a capacity, but lost it), nor is it necessarily an
absence of something of intrinsic value, as opposed to a "means to an end"-as
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they will be treated with care, but wouldn't it be better, the
prevailing ethics in prenatal practice tell us, if they never
arrived? 100 It is important to emphasize that our current
medical technology, except perhaps in rare instances, allows us
only to avoid the births of such children once detected rather
than to correct the abnormality in utero, so it is clearly lives
avoided rather than disabilities corrected that constitutes the
current goal of such practices. We cannot justify the lack of
welcome for most of these children who would have been born on
the grounds that they would have suffered if they were in fact
born. While it is true that prenatal screening detects some
conditions from which children will horribly suffer, such as Tay
Sachs disease,10 the most common use of such testing is to
identify and select against Down syndrome, 10 2 a condition which
visual capacity is a means to (but not the only means to) aesthetic pleasure. Id. at
324-27. She writes, "Brief acquaintance with people who have disabilities and who
work, play, study, love, and enjoy the world should demonstrate that very few
conditions preclude participating in the basic activities of life, even if some
conditions limit some classes of them, or methods of engaging in them." Id. at 324;
see also National Council on Disability, supra note 54, at 284-88 (discussing both
the underestimation of the life quality of people with disabilities and the fallibility
of medical predictions).
100 "For whom?," of course, is the critical and often unasked question, although
courts challenged by wrongful life claims have been unable to avoid this issue. In
the wrongful life cause of action, the child alleges injury on the basis of having been
born because of the negligence of a health care provider in the delivery of carrier
screening or prenatal care. The perceived impossibility of determining that no life
would be preferable to life, and birth thus causing injury, has caused most
jurisdictions to reject the wrongful life cause of action. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown,
361 So.2d 546, 547 (Ala. 1978) ("The infant plaintiff would have us measure the
difference between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it
is impossible to make such a determination." (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227
A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967)). But see ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO
CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 242-56 (2000) (arguing that a wrong may be done
by bringing a child with a disability into the world even if the harm is not done to
that child).
101 Within the first year of life children with Tay-Sachs disease, who at birth
appear "[n]ormal ... begin to regress and lose contact with their families and
environment .... declining inexorably toward a totally vegetative state." Madeleine
J. Goodman & Lenn E. Goodman, The Overselling of Genetic Anxiety, HASTINGS
CTR. REP., Oct. 1982, at 20. "[Mlental retardation .... convulsions, ... blindness ...
gross physical deformit[ies]. ... [and] pain" characterize the remainder of the child's
life. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480-81 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980). The life span of children with Tay-Sachs is two to four years. Goodman &
Goodman, supra, at 20.
102 Mary Mahowald, Aren't We All Eugenicists? Commentary on Paul
Lombardo's "Taking Eugenics Seriously," 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 219, 221 (2003).
Mahowald argues that social attitudes and practices relating to prenatal testing for
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comes with no more suffering than the average lot. 103 Moreover,
not only does the practice of prenatal selection suggest that
children with genetic disabilities are not welcome but also, as a
number of scholars writing in this area have pointed out, the
routine selection against fetuses or embryos with disabilities
signals a lack of welcome to people who are currently living with
disabilities. 104
As the welcome of children born with disabilities is suspect
in our current practices of prenatal screening, so is the welcome
of other people with severe disabilities in our current openness to
consider assisted suicide for them and in our readiness to accept
a withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for such individuals.
Our compassion, by which we imagine and perhaps even fear the
tragic condition of the other person befalling us, tells us that the
person with a severe disability is rational to want to end his life.
In fact, that conclusion-that life is not worth living in such a
condition-is constantly thrust in the face of people with severe
disabilities. For example, Adam Milani reminds us that when
Christopher Reeves was interviewed on television in 1995
following the riding accident that caused him to become
quadriplegic, he said that he had briefly considered suicide after
his accident. 05 While this was only a passing remark in an
hour-long interview, "that sound bite appeared in almost every
commercial advertising the interview, in the introductory piece
Down syndrome illustrate "bad eugenics" for a number of reasons, one of which is
the "deep seated ableism on the part of society's leaders." Id. at 234. "This ethos of
ableism no doubt influences individual women and couples to conform to its
standard by avoiding the birth of a child who is disabled." Id.
1o Id. at 232.
104 Adrienne Asch writes that societal promotion of prenatal selection to avoid
disabilities inherently conflicts with the goal of social inclusion of persons with
disabilities: assumptions that underlie the social endorsement of prenatal
selection-assumptions (which she critiques as uninformed and narrowly conceived)
about the quality of life of people born with disabilities-undermine the welcome of
people with disabilities that laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act
purport to provide. The necessary, if unintended, consequences of institutional
promotion of prenatal selection against disabilities are a devaluation of the lives of
persons who live now and will live in the future with disabilities. Asch, supra note
96, at 332-39; see also David Wasserman, A Choice of Evils in Prenatal Testing, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 295, 299 (2003) (preferring the "evil" of allowing prenatal
selection for any trait parents wish to test for, with the potential risk of degrading
the parent-child relationship and commodifying children, to the "evil" of allowing
testing only for certain disabling traits, with the effect of stigmatizing people with
disabilities).
05 Milani, supra note 48, at 199-200 n.243.
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preceding it, in the lead of the Associate Press piece about it, and
in several headlines reporting it."106 Other people with
substantial and visible disabilities report similar experiences. 10 7
One of the many problems with assisted suicide is the
confluence of motives of the people who may be involved.
Assisted suicide, whether by a spouse or a physician, would be
somewhat less troubling if the assistant truly desired the
continued presence in the world of the individual for whom death
is sought, and truly desired the presence of that individual in her
current and perhaps future deteriorating condition, rather than
holding onto some vague wish for the way she used to be. In
such a case, the assistant's agreement to help her spouse, friend,
or patient toward death would be antithetical to her own wishes,
rather than in conformity with her similar appraisal of the
situation: that non-existence of the suffering person is better
than this existence. Only then might we be able to argue
legitimately that permitting assisted suicide respects the
individual patient's autonomy.108
Compassion seeks to end-in its better form, to end the
suffering of the other person; in its less laudable form, to end
the sorrowful feelings we ourselves experience when faced with
someone else's suffering. If we can end or avoid suffering
without ending or avoiding lives then perhaps welcome can be
achieved as well as compassion, but it is a fundamentally
different orientation. Welcome says, "Come as you are." You are
welcome here and everywhere without regard to any impairment
or dependency.
B. Alterity and Rupture
'A life is not important except in the impact
it has on other lives. 109
As with welcome, the concepts within Levinas's work of
alterity and rupture offer ways of approaching the suffering
10 Id.
107 Id.
108 Autonomy is the primary principle upon which advocates for physician-
assisted suicide rely. See generally Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy after
Washington v. Glucksberg, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY 43 (1998).
109 This quote from Jackie Robinson is found on his grave. Find A Grave,
Jackie Robinson's headstone, at http://www.findagrave.com/photos/101c/222/
robinsonl.jpg (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
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person or the person in need of care that can be contrasted with
some of the more problematic aspects of a compassionate
response. Compassion may allow the object of compassion to
remain simply that-an object that is understood by reference to
the observer and who is in a sense possessed by the observer.
The idea of alterity is that the other person is uniquely outside of
the observer and cannot be understood by reference to the self.
Rather, the self is to be understood by reference to the other
person. Rupture captures the idea that the ethical encounter
with the other person ruptures the observer's world; he is no
longer a mere observer, but instead is someone who is in
conversation and relation with the other person.
1. Alterity
As we have already seen, Levinas's work calls for a radical
reorientation from the self to other people. He challenges the
primacy of the ego, or the I, or what he calls "egology"110 in
Western philosophy. When "I" am first, he tells us, when truths
and values are determined by reference to myself and I
understand other people primarily by their usefulness to me or
even merely by way of comparison to myself, a totality is
achieved.' The other person is "neutraliz[ed]," 112 reduced to
nothing that can alter or affect me. John Wild has explained
Levinas's conception of such "totalizers" as "satisfied with
themselves and with the systems they can organize around
themselves as they already are."'113
I 10 TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 44.
1 John Wild, Introduction to TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 12.
Hence the title, "Totality and Infinity." For Levinas, infinity, which is what we
desire that is truly outside of ourselves, other than ourselves, is found in the other
person. See supra note 98.
112 TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 45-46.
11: Wild, supra note 111, at 17. The traditional assumption that we know,
understand, and experience others by reference to the self is not merely, in Levinas'
view, an orientation troubling at the level of individual relationships, but is the
orientation of violence, war, and politics. PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 123. Thus,
while Levinas' work in Totality and Infinity focuses on how an individual subject, or
I, must treat other people, rather than describing the rules that should govern
states or communities, his eye is ultimately on the world scene. The question
Levinas tells us he seeks to answer in this work is no less than how do we replace
war with peace? Id. at 122. The classic answer to this question is that we achieve
peace through expectations of universal behaviors, "objective" organizations that
treat all people equally, requirements that individuals "limit the range of their
desires" in exchange for the satisfaction of their needs, and a political order that
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According to Levinas, this way of understanding the world
only through the self is a perspective promoted by Socrates'
teaching and all of Western philosophy. To be free in this
tradition is to "receive nothing of the Other," but what is already
in me and that I possessed as though from all eternity. 114
Freedom in the Western tradition means "the reduction of all
Otherness to the Same,"15  and thus Levinas calls this
philosophical tradition "the primacy of the same."1 6  The
"primacy of the same" is the philosophy of power, where other
people are suppressed or possessed in order to maintain the I
unchanged.
Levinas rejects this Western focus on autonomy. Rather
than focusing on the self, ethics requires that we focus on the
other. This re-orientation is not merely about who comes first,
whose claims are precedent--a subject that will be addressed
below 17-- but is also a way of relating to others. Other people
are not to be understood as another instance of the self. They
represents a "compromise of interested forces." Id. at 127. This answer is
unsatisfactory to Levinas as totalizing, impersonal, neglectful of the individual's
"unicity," and ultimately tyrannical. TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 47;
PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 127. In such a system, individuals are overcome; they
become singular instances of a universe, with "roles and functional definitions,"
PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 127, and eventually "bearers of forces that command
them unbeknown to themselves." TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 21.
According to scholar Adriaan Peperzak, "Levinas' search is oriented to another
peace." PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 127. Rather than the uncertain and unstable
peace of totalization, Levinas looks to the originary peace found in the face to face
relationship between an individual and a stranger. This is a relation that has been
generally neglected by the Western tradition. Id. at 128. It is like a "lost memory."
Id.
"14 TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 43.
115 Id. at 45.
116 Id. Levinas writes:
Cognition [in Western philosophy] consists in grasping the individual,
which alone exists, not in its singularity which does not count, but in its
generality, of which alone there is science. And here every power begins.
The surrender of exterior things to human freedom through their
generality does not only mean, in all innocence, their comprehension, but
also their being taken in hand, their domestication, their possession. Only
in possession does the I complete the identification of the diverse .... In a
civilization which the philosophy of the Same reflects, freedom is realized
as a wealth. Reason, which reduced the other, is appropriation and power.
Emmanuel Levinas, A Commentary on Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite, in
PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 88, 97-98 [hereinafter "Philosophy and the Idea of the
Infinite']. This essay preceded the larger work, Totality and Infinity, and is a
precursor to it. PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 38.
117 See infra text accompanying notes 136-52.
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are not to become a "theme and an object," falling "into the
network of a priori ideas, which I bring to bear so as to capture
it." 118 The human other is not reducible to a form of the self and
in this sense is not capable of being comprehended and thus not
capable of being possessed or used. Levinas contrasts the way
we experience the other person with the way we comprehend
objects. "An object, we know, is integrated into the identity of
the Same; the I makes of it its theme, and then its property, its
booty, its prey, or its victim."'119 Rather than as an object, the
other person must be encountered as something completely
exterior to one's self, a radical alterity, an enigma, never truly
understood.120
John Wild explains the basic differences between the
Western philosophical tradition's emphasis on the "I" and
Levinas's emphasis on the "Other" as one of orientation:
The basic difference is between a mode of thought which tries to
gather all things around the mind, or self, of the thinker, and
an externally oriented mode which attempts to penetrate into
what is radically other than the mind that is thinking it. This
difference emerges with peculiar clarity in the case of my
meeting with the other person. I may either decide to remain
within myself, assimilating the other and trying to make use of
him, or I may take the risk of going out of my way and trying to
speak and to give to him. This does not fulfill a need. I can
satisfy my needs more adequately by keeping to myself and the
members of the in-group with which I am identified. And yet it
is the expression of a desire, as Levinas calls it, for that which
transcends me and my self-centered categories.' 21
How does compassion as commonly understood measure up
to the ideals of an appreciation of the alterity of the other
person? Imaginative dwelling, seeing others as like us means
118 Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite, supra note 116, at 97.
I11 Id. at 109. According to Francis Dominic Degnin, "the very definition and
condition for violence is to ignore, reduce, attack, or dismiss the irreducible moral
singularity of another person. Most often this is done through treating a person in
terms of one's own needs, categories, or principles." Francis Dominic Degnin,
Levinas and the Hippocratic Oath: A Discussion of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 22 J.
MED. & PHIL. 99, 104 (1997).
120 Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite, supra note 116, at 97; PEPERZAK,
supra note 1, at 21-22 ("Since the other cannot become a moment of such a totality,
it is not a phenomenon but rather an 'enigma' not to be defined in phenomenological
terms. If visibility, in a broad and metaphorical sense, is a feature of every being
that can become a phenomenon, Levinas may even call the other 'invisible.'"
121 Wild, supra note 111, at 16.
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that we will presume to know more than we do or can about
their suffering, that we will appropriate the other person's
suffering, that we will comprehend her as a theme rather than a
person, and that we may choose to act to relieve the other
person's suffering out of mixed motives that include a need to
relieve our own suffering caused by viewing and being in the
presence of the object of our compassionate feelings. These are
failures to appreciate that the person whose suffering is
contemplated is a uniquely other person than the one who
observes the suffering. Rather than looking inward to relate to
another person, one must look to that person. As Levinas writes,
"One does not question oneself concerning him; one questions
him."122
Therefore, in the examples considered in the critique of
compassion relating to people with disabilities, the ethical
orientation Levinas provides would require that we do a number
of things differently. For one, we would not try to use our
imagination as a primary measure--or even as a reliable
measure--of how someone who is suffering feels or what she
needs or desires. 123 We would instead listen to the person for
whom we might experience empathic feelings in order to
appreciate her perspective. The comparison of the two right to
die cases discussed in Part IV of this Article reveals how
important this difference in approach can be. In the case of
Elizabeth Bouvia, the justices of the California appeals court
imagined for themselves what Bouvia's life must be like and
essentially declared it to be without value. 124 In the case of Ms.
B, the court took great care to let Ms. B speak for herself, and
while approving the removal of life support on the basis of
autonomous choice, concluded that Ms. B had much to live for
and much to contribute to society.125
Secondly, orienting ourselves to the alterity of the other
person would mean that we take care not to act in ways to
relieve our own suffering by way of association but to focus
instead on the other person's needs. The compassionate
122 TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 47.
12: In this vein, consider the work of Adrienne Asch on the issue of whether a
person born with a physical impairment experiences that impairment in the same
way as someone who has lost an ability through trauma or sickness. See Asch, supra
note 96, at 324-27.
124 See infra text accompanying notes 172-87.
12 5 See infra text accompanying notes 196-223.
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approach gives the appearance of this latter focus, but its
adoption of imaginative dwelling as the mechanism for
producing a caring response allows for a mixture of motives that
the orientation toward alterity would not.
Focus on the other person as other rather than as a form of
ourselves also makes us open to evaluating and perhaps
changing some of the social norms and legal rules that may work
for us and in which we may feel comfortable but which do not
appropriately accommodate, respect, and care for the other.
Thus, for example, while the able-bodied, white, educated
population tends to approve of courts' allowing persons with
disabilities to be removed from life support measures on the
basis of their expression of autonomous choice alone, people with
disabilities often decry such practices as not providing the same
kind of protection against suicidal impulses to the disabled as to
the abled.126
2. Rupture
Rupture means, at a minimum, that we are changed by our
experience of our face-to-face encounter with the other person.
Because we see the other person outside our own referential
126 In August of 1995, Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (allowing physician-
assisted suicide) was declared unconstitutional and enjoined by the United States
District Court in Oregon because the Act denied terminally ill patients the equal
protection of the laws regarding suicide and physician malpractice as are granted to
persons who are not terminally ill. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1439, 1439 (D.
Ore. 1995) (granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to Equal
Protection Clause claim and granting permanent injunction against recognition of
the Act), vacated by 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
Similar arguments about the lack of equal treatment regarding the suicidal
impulses of the healthy and the disabled have been made in other contexts. See,
e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 632 (Nev. 1990) (Springer, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with majority's confirmation of right of man with quadriplegia to
remove life-sustaining respirator). Justice Springer concluded that majority's
willingness to allow Mr. Bergstedt's ventilator to be removed, when he was not
dying, constituted a "prejudicial treatment of Mr. Bergstedt because his assisted
suicide was sanctioned and facilitated only because of his disabled condition." Id. at
635 (Springer, J., dissenting). The dissent also quotes with approval from the
amicus curiae brief submitted in the case by Thomas J. Marzen, general counsel of
the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and Disabled: "[Value
judgments ... about the worth of Mr. Bergstedt's life have clouded [the] ability to
properly assess the suicidal basis for Mr. Bergstedt's request to die .. " Id. at 633-
34 (Springer, J., dissenting). Justice Springer referred to the amicus brief even
though it had been rejected by the court because of late filing because "it is the only
argument to be found in this case that favors life instead of death." Id. at 634 n.6
(Springer, J., dissenting).
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framework, the experience of rupture goes far beyond the
experience of attempting to comprehend the other person. For
example:
Another comes to the fore as other if and only if his or her
,appearance' breaks, pierces, destroys the horizon of my
egocentric monism, that is, when the other's invasion of my
world destroys the empire in which all phenomena are, from
the outset, a priori, condemned to function as moments of my
universe. 127
The other person is not merely to be understood by me as an
object that I might possess but is to be recognized as someone
with whom I am engaged. 128 Within this ethical orientation, one
is transformed by the encounter with the stranger.
By contrast, the compassionate response requires no such
transformation, no "transcendence" from the self. We may be
compassionate yet see other people as functioning as mere
"moments in our universe." In the DeShaney case, Joshua
appears to have been such a mere moment in the Court's
universe.
It is not adequate or ethical to be a justice on the Supreme
Court and to hear the DeShaney case and to respond, simply and
by reference to precedent, that the law does not require the state
to protect Joshua from his abusive father. If I am that justice,
then Joshua's story, his legal issue, becomes part of my own
castle of the law. I require that Joshua himself stay outside of
my castle, and I refuse to consider what kind of structure of law
he needs for shelter and protection. Operating on compassion, I
can say that I was moved, 129 that I found the child's story
moving, but I need not move. Under the ethics of radical
responsibility, I am moved by this case to move. I am changed. I
cannot be who I was. Because this child's call was made upon
me, I cannot be the person I was before that call was made.
127 PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 19-20.
128 As Peperzak explains, my response to the other person can be to see her as
instrumental to my needs, or to observe her from an aesthetic perspective, having
such and such color hair, eyes, and other features, but neither of these responses
allows the other to reveal herself as other. They merely incorporate the other as a
part of self. Id. at 19.
129 As the Chief Justice wrote, "Judges and lawyers, like other humans, are
moved by natural sympathy in a case like this .... " DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
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This is the idea of rupture, and it is, under Levinas's work, a
necessary step for the self to exist. It is our answering the call of
the other that calls us into being; the ethical relationship of
responsibility is prior to existence. Without the other person and
communication with the other person, there is no thought
available to us. We are without awareness, thought, or being-
ness. We only exist because of other people and their claims
upon us. It is as if the phone is ringing. If you answer it, you
are there, and if you do not, you are, for the person calling, in
every way, "not there."
If Joshua calls and I do not answer that call then I am not
there. It is as if the judge is sitting at home and the phone rings
and he knows it is Joshua and he knows Joshua is in trouble and
he says "I know that, but I can't answer it because of precedents
and rules that tell me when I can and can't answer the phone. I
feel bad for that child who is calling; I feel compassion for him,
but I cannot answer." If I am the judge and I do not answer, I
may as well not be there.
We can contrast that response with the judge who hears the
phone ringing and knows it is Joshua calling and that he is in
trouble, but who says, "I know the precedents and rules tell me
the state has no duty here, but I have to pick up the phone. I
don't know what to do, I don't know the answer, but I will pick
up the phone." This is the rupture. I am brought into a
relationship with the child where I must, in effect, look into his
face and answer for the suffering that is found there. It is a
relationship of responsibility. I have to "face" my responsibility.
The first step in acting on that responsibility is to answer the
phone.
In the DeShaney case, Joshua called upon the justices of the
Supreme Court, as he called upon state workers to protect him,
and the justices-in particular Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White, Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Kennedy13 0-were not there. I do not know how the
Supreme Court should have defined the duties of the state or
whether or not those duties were properly met in this case, but
the point here is that the Court did not understand itself to be in
a relationship with this child. The Court was grossly dismissive
of the child's claim. In fact, its expression of sympathy was not
130 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 190.
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offered from the Court itself but was in fact carefully removed
from it. The opinion tells us that other people-"[U]udges and
lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy in a
case like this .. ... "13 1-not that the justices themselves were so
moved. In addition, the Justices chose language to deny in effect
their own role in the decision to offer Joshua no aid. 132 The
Court, in describing the relevant precedent cases, wrote: "But
these cases afford petitioners no help. Taken together, they
stand only for the proposition that when the State takes a person
into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being."1 33
Benjamin Zipursky insightfully writes:
By making 'cases' the subject of the first sentence, the Court
obscured the fact that it was the Justices who decided to offer
Joshua no help. Moreover, the Court aspired to report on what
these cases 'stand for,' suggesting that their meaning exists
independently of the Court's interpretation of them. Yet, as the
Justices' disagreement in DeShaney indicates [Justices
Brennan and Blackmun argued in dissent that the earlier cases
did allow the Court room to find for Joshua and his mother],
these cases can be read in different ways.134
If a father is beating his son and nobody helps him or tries
to help him or has a duty to help him, that is wrong. Joshua in
effect asked for help all the way to the Supreme Court. When he
got there, the place was empty.
C. Responsibility and Action
"Every gun [that is] made, every warship [built], every rocket
fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger
and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed."135
Answering the call when it is made is the first step towards
fulfilling the responsibility we have towards one another. For
Levinas, it is what makes us human. Our existence, not only
1:11 Id. at 202.
21 Zipursky, supra note 15, at 1118.
3: Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200).
134 Id.
1315 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Toward a Golden Age of Peace, Address Before the
Am. Soc. of Newspaper Editors (Apr. 16, 1953), in PEACE WITH JUSTICE 34, 37
(1961).
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who we are specifically but also just our very being, depends
upon the other people to whom we are responsible. This
responsibility means that we are obligated to respond to the
suffering and needs of others, and we are responsible to
everyone, for everything. The subject's responsibility to the
other is infinite in that it is never satisfied. At no time may the
subject rest, comfortable that she has given enough, that the
claims placed upon her by the other person are satisfied. Under
Levinas's account of ethics, 136 "I can never do enough."'137
"lC, See ROBERT BERNASCONI & EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 580 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972). "Levinas has readily conceded that he
does not provide an ethics but only an account of the conditions of ethics." Id.
1.7 Id. The combination of Levinas' idea of rupture and responsibility might
appear to overrun the individual. Within the context of the caregiving
responsibilities of nurses, some scholars have rejected the relational feminists'
"ethics of care" on this ground, namely, that the nurse is overrun-she gives and
gives until she is a non-person, an entity engaged in "slave-caring." Nelson, supra
note 19, at 10. This possibility-that caring reduces the caregiver to nothing-is
especially troubling when we acknowledge that caregiving has traditionally been
the province of women. As Robin West has written, the "selfless" woman may be so
out of genuine empathy for others, or (and this is what we must be wary of) out of a
"harmful and injurious lack of regard for oneself: a sense of self-loathing, a lack of
self-esteem or self-respect, and at root a failure to give oneself one's 'due': a quite
general, massive denial of the importance, equality, and dignity of oneself." WEST,
supra note 12, at 79. Relational feminists, taking the cue from Carol Gilligan, have
tended to answer the criticism of self-abnegation by appealing to the other moral
orientation, that of justice, and emphasizing its equal importance to care. See id. at
79-84; Bookman & Aboulafia, supra note 19, at 172-73.
Levinas, by contrast, does not counterpose care (or for him, responsibility for the
other) with justice, as if they are separate moral demands with separate origins.
While it is true that for Levinas concerns about justice (which works by rules that
apply to all) might be seen as a corrective to the ethics of the face-to-face relation
and vice versa, justice is also a required dimension, a necessary conclusion, an
outgrowth of (rather than a counterpoint to), the responsibility the subject has to
one other-because the subject has a responsibility not just to those within a "zone
of care" or with whom the subject has a particular relationship (in contrast to
typical formulations of the feminist ethic of care) but to all others, and even to
himself as an other (to others). Moreover, the personal ethic of openness to the other
in encounter is not relieved by the subject's awareness that he is also an "other."
Nor is it relieved by the appreciation that universal rules of justice may be
necessary for ordered relations between the many. Levinas does not relinquish his
claim that the subject to be in ethical orientation toward the other must be altered
by the encounter with the other's alterity. He counsels that the rupture that occurs
in that ethical encounter with the other does not cause us to be "eaten up." The idea
of rupture is not that the other has power over us, willing us to do what is
commanded, reducing us to nothing, rather that we are not able to exercise our
power over him. The other's "alterity is manifested in a mastery that does not
conquer, but teaches. Teaching is not a species of a genus called domination ......
TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 88, at 171.
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Furthermore, there is no reciprocity of claims. There is no
semblance of contract, either imaginarily negotiated, as in some
social contract theory, or in terms of an imposed quid pro quo.
There is not even a consideration by the subject of what the
subject's treatment of the other person might prompt by way of
reciprocal generosity, as the golden rule might at times
suggest-this other person is like me, therefore I will treat him
like I would like him to treat me. 138
You cannot learn much of Levinas's ideas before asking
what such an account of ethics can mean as a practical matter.
Levinas has little to say on that question. He says even less on
what his theory of ethics and existence might offer with respect
to our approach to law, to what extent we might be influenced by
his thought in our expectations of social behavior in the legal
context. When he mentions law, he speaks of it as outside the
realm of his concern. 139 Because the ethical writings of Levinas
expect so much of a person, perhaps we should just dismiss their
relevance to law or considerations of social policy. I think we
should not for the following reasons.
First, we must acknowledge that there has been and
continues to be support for a role in the law and considerations
of social policy for a caring or fellow feeling response to people
that is not encompassed within systems of rules or principles
based simply upon a recognition of the equal right of every
138 The subject's responsibility to the other is asymmetrical in that the subject
has no claim to reciprocity from the other. I have no right to ask of the other person
what the other person asks of me. BERNASCONI & LEVINAS, supra note 136, at 580.
Bernasconi writes: "My obligations to the Other are not contracted by me. They not
only precede any debts I incur, but also go beyond anything I could possibly
satisfy .... Id. at 579.
1:19 "Responsibility for the neighbor is precisely what goes beyond the legal and
obliges beyond contracts; it comes to me from what is prior to my freedom, from a
nonpresent, an immemorial." Emmanuel Levinas, God and Philosophy, in
EMMANUEL LEVINAS: BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 129, 142 (Adriaan T.
Peperzak et al. eds., 1996). See generally PEPERZAK, supra note 1, at 166-84,
concerning Levinas' discussions of social justice, a consideration required by the
introduction of "the third," the third person who is not accounted for in the face-to-
face relation between the self and the other. The existence of the third, or other
others, limits our ultimate ability to make only one other prior to all else; instead,
we must have a system of justice that does have universal rules of application, and
that recognizes that the subject is an other for other people, thus treating all as
equal. But such universal rules bring "universalization, objectification, totality, and
even calculus," id. at 180, the ways of human interaction that Levinas has revealed
as violent. In this way, ethics and justice might be said to pose constant challenges
to one another. See infra note 148.
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person to be free from unjustified interference with their person
or what we have decided is their property. The examples are
abundant: from laws passed providing aid to the poor, 140
requiring hospitals to provide emergency care,141 and funding
programs to prevent premature births, to judicial decisions
wrestling with abortion rights, particularly those of minors,142 or
with the education rights of children,143 or with the rights of
terminally ill individuals seeking a withdrawal of life-support
measures 144 or physician assisted suicide.' 45 Many legal contexts
140 This reference is not to suggest that such programs are adequate.
141 See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (2000).
142 See Lois Shepherd, Looking Forward with the Right of Privacy, 49 U. KAN.
L. REV. 251, 294-95, 306-07 (2001) (arguing that the requirement of a judicial
bypass option to avoid consent or notice to parents reveals some sensitivity to the
needs of pregnant teenagers, and does not merely respect their autonomy). In
Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court writes, "the potentially severe detriment facing
a pregnant woman is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her
probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity,
unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor." 443 U.S. 622,
642 (1979) (citations omitted).
143 See Henderson, supra note 14, at 1593-1609 (identifying Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as illustrating empathic understanding, "leading to
a transformation of legal understanding, an opening of opportunities for new legal
categories and interpretations").
144 The early cases regarding the rights of terminally ill individuals to be
removed from life support measures gave considerable attention to the quality of life
that could be prolonged, see, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 656-57, 659, 663-64
(N.J. 1976) cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Later
cases have focused primarily on the patient's preferences, see, e.g., In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209, 1221-37 (N.J. 1985). With respect to the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment for people who are not terminally ill, see McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d
617, 622-23 (Nev. 1990), where a discussion of quality of life still takes place. In
particular, note the expression of the dissenting justice, who disapproved of the
majority's agreement to allow withdrawal of life support, but nevertheless writes, "I
have agonized over this case. At one moment I am haunted by the picture of a
hopeless, wretched and tortured person who has no desire except to end his
suffering by ending his life .... How can any one who can help him possibly turn
down his plaint?" Id. at 637 (Springer, J., dissenting).
14' See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 799, 836-39
(9th. Cir. 1996) (finding that the degree of suffering of terminally ill patients
determined both the strength of their liberty interest in pursuing physician-assisted
suicide and the relative weakness of the state's interests in prohibiting such
practices), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Prior to
reaching en banc review, the panel of the appellate court had also wrestled with the
role of compassion in consideration of the plaintiffs' claims. See Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 594 (9th. Cir. 1995); see also Shepherd, supra
note 142, at 288-99 (discussing petitioners' briefs in the Supreme Court case that
relied on a constellation of liberty interests to support a constitutional right to
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require consideration of the ethical response due from one person
or group-and from the court itself in the context of
adjudication-to another person that goes beyond principles of
respect for autonomy of the person or equality. Sometimes
consideration of the ethical response is discussed outright, as
appeals to compassion for the suffering of the terminally ill were
made in the Supreme Court cases regarding physician-assisted
suicide.1 46 At other times the effect of such considerations seem
apparent, but there is little discussion about them. In still other
cases, the apparent lack of such consideration-consideration of
what kind of treatment or response is due one person by another
or society as a whole other than simply non-interference or equal
treatment-opens the court to widespread criticism, as in the
DeShaney case.
This caring or fellow feeling response is often described as
compassion, yet as we have seen, compassion has serious
shortcomings, not the least of which is that it does not entail
responsibility. Beside an ethics of radical responsibility, an
ethics of compassion is a dim impulse. There is a place in law
and social policy for the caring response; although, as I
acknowledged in the beginning of the Article, that place may be
properly bounded by concerns for autonomy and the rule of law.
Compassion does not adequately fill that place. An ethics of
radical responsibility may. Its emphasis on responsibility
requires us to ask hard questions about what should be done by
the state or society as a whole or what should be expected in the
interactions between individual people, even if full assessment of
the situation does not require that action be taken. Compassion
is too often viewed as a mere emotion that stands outside the law
and any considerations of duty. No one must move as a result of
it. The ethics of radical responsibility in its insistence on
welcome, an appreciation of alterity and an openness to being
changed by our encounters with one another, in addition to its
insistence on responsibility, provides an approach that is
distinctively different from compassion and that avoids some of
its weaknesses.
The second reason why we should not dismiss the potential
contribution that Levinas's philosophical works might have to
physician-assisted suicide, that constellation including the avoidance of suffering,
decisional autonomy, and bodily integrity).
14' See Shepherd, supra note 142, at 308-10.
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legal and social theory is that they provide an interruption to our
usual ways of thinking, for example, to our uncritical acceptance
of compassion as the right ethical response to someone who is
suffering. While Levinas's work does not provide us with
principles or rules that we might follow, 147  it offers an
orientation by which we might measure the humanity of our
social institutions and legal decisions.148 We might ask, how and
in what ways do our existing social expectations differ from an
orientation of radical responsibility and how and in what ways
do those social expectations appear inadequate against such an
orientation? 149 There is a radical difference between starting
with the question, "What am I to do here and now, in answer to
the call of the other person?" and the question that libertarian
and, indeed, most liberal theory begins with, which is, "What is
my realm of freedom, what are my rights?" With Levinas, as
147 Levinas does not offer principles of ethics, but instead an experience of
obligation. See Degnin, supra note 119, at 105. This experience of obligation is,
according to Francis Dominic Degnin, "an affective relation and not a principle after
all." Id.
Obligation is experienced as an absolute call, an absolute demand, but it is
also without cognitive content. This suggests that although we can argue
principles until the cows come home, we will come no closer to
understanding the nature of morality-or of our distinctly human nature-
until we recognize that at the heart of obligation is an affective relation
and not a principle after all. Again, this does not mean that one could or
should dispense with moral principles-they are absolutely essential for
the sort of justice which allows communities and societies to function and
flourish. But their regulative and guiding functions must not replace or
obscure the concrete, singular call of obligation which is at their origin.
Id.
148 The ethics of Levinas requires the subject to answer the call of the Other,
even every other, but the rules of justice must order the relations not only between
those others and the subject, but also between all such others, with rules of general
applicability. Ethics and justice might be said to pose constant corrective challenges
to each other, or "interruptions." "Ethics in Levinas' sense," writes Robert
Bernasconi, "keeps justice from being satisfied with itself," but justice also serves as
a corrective to ethics. BERNASCONI & LEVINAS, supra note 136, at 580. Ethics would
appear to pose a constant challenge to the general just rule in that it brings to the
foreground the case of the particular other in the face to face encounter, in the here
and now. Likewise, a constant challenge to the ethical relation (the face to face, here
and now encounter) is the requirements of justice, the requirements of a just set of
affairs, rules, schemata, and so on. See supra note 139.
149 According to Robert Bernasconi, while Levinas' work has often been
criticized as having little to offer to political theory, "his challenge to the good
conscience of ethics applies equally well to politics." BERNASCONI & LEVINAS, supra
note 136, at 580.
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with Kant, 1 50 our duty to help another in any particular situation
may be imperfect in that it may not be the strongest moral
imperative of the moment, and we may not always be held
accountable for living up to it. Indeed, we can't be. Because
under the ethics of radical responsibility, the phone is ringing off
the hook. Calls are made from every direction, by everyone, and
they can't all be answered. Levinas's work provides a moral
foundation to understanding that answering those calls is an
urgent duty nonetheless. This terrain of ethics is "fractured,
uncertain, and unsafe,"'151 yet according to Francis Degnin, "[t]he
power of Levinas' thought is found precisely in his willingness to
live within this uneasiness."'152
Another lesson we might take from an ethics of radical
responsibility is to appreciate the relationship between every one
of us and that any action or inaction on our part affects each
other person, and that a responsibility for such actions or
inactions attaches. Indeed, every act of kindness toward one is
as an act of violence toward another. 153 Choices to allocate funds
or energies for one purpose are choices not to allocate them for
other purposes. Our actions are never without effect or cost on
other people; an ethics of radical responsibility highlights that
fact.
This might be illustrated by looking again at prenatal
testing and selection practices. In general, the primary
emphasis in any evaluation of the practice of prenatal testing
and selection is on respecting the autonomy of the prospective
parents to make reproductive decisions. Where responsibility is
150 JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 51 (1970). Murphy
writes:
A duty is imperfect if no one is in a position to demand by right that it be
complied with. I have, according to Kant, a duty to promote human
happiness. This duty is imperfect, however, because no one can demand by
right that I make him happy, can regard himself as wronged if I fail to
make him happy.
Id. An "imperfect duty," such as the duty of benevolence, is "not constantly and
universally binding; that is, we are not obligated or duty-bound to help everyone all
the time." Id. The same is not quite true for Levinas, because while the duties
cannot possibly all be met, they remain obligations nonetheless.
1,5' Degnin, supra note 119, at 106.
152 Id. Degnin further explains, "The ethical life is not an escape from
uncertainty, but a responsibility carried out in fear and trembling, without
adequate resources or knowledge, knowing that even though the best one can do is
rarely enough, one must act nonetheless." Id. at 118.
153 Id. at 104.
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recognized, it is only in the doctor's responsibility to provide
sufficient and accurate information to prospective parents about
their risks of having a child with a condition society considers
disabling-to enable them to exercise their autonomy to choose
whether to bear a child with a disability. 154 There is virtually no
recognition, even among scholars writing within the disability
rights critique of prenatal testing,155 of the responsibility that
parents have in making these difficult choices to people living or
who will later live with a similar disability. There is, again,
little or no recognition that every decision that every parent
makes to abort a fetus because of its disability has an effect on
the reproductive decisions of the parents to come. While such
individual parents do not intend their individual acts to be
messages to anyone else, 5 6 messages are nevertheless received
by people living with disabilities similar to those for which
abortions take place that it would have been better if they had
not been born and by people who are contemplating a pregnancy
that these are the conditions they should likewise wish to avoid
in their offspring. The ethics of radical responsibility does not
mean that these parents are wrong in making the decisions that
they do, but it does point out that those decisions have
consequences to other people in ways that are not typically
acknowledged or considered.
Finally, it seems to me that we do have certain moral
intuitions about the responsibilities that certain people have for
others in given contexts. Sometimes these responsibilities
become legal responsibilities, as when the parties have entered
into a contract or a special relationship of trust, such as a
fiduciary relationship, or because of family bonds, such as
154 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412-14, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901-02 (1978) (considering a wrongful birth cause of action).
Plaintiffs alleged they were never advised by defendants of increased risk of Down
syndrome in children born to women over thirty-five years of age or of availability of
amniocentesis test. Id. at 808-09.
155 Generally, scholars writing within what has become known as the disability
rights perspective take pains to make clear that they are not offering criticism of the
individual choices of parents, but of the social and institutional practices that
influence those choices. See, e.g., Asch, supra note 96, at 332-34. However, other
scholars have countered that if there is not a problem with the individual choices,
then it is difficult to conclude that there is a problem with the collection of those
individual choices, which is what we might see as the societal response. See
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 100, at 53-54.
151 Asch, supra note 96, at 333.
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between a parent and child. Oftentimes, however, there is no
legal duty, or the legal duties have been fulfilled. Nevertheless,
we still generally understand someone as having had a moral
responsibility to do something more or something differently. At
those times, while the moral responsibility may not be legally
enforced, recognition that it exists may nevertheless have an
effect on a legal determination of a different sort. In addition, a
judicial or other means of state urging that such responsibilities
be fulfilled, without legally requiring it, may improve the quality
of people's lives. An example of both of these phenomena can be
found in the Supreme Court's opinion in the physician-assisted
suicide case of Washington v. Glucksbergl57 with respect to the
availability of palliative care for the terminally ill. Recognizing
that terminally ill patients in pain should be receiving adequate
palliative care from their physicians without undue state
interference influenced some of the justices in determining that
there was no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.15
8
Moreover, the emphasis within the opinion that such care should
be provided, even aggressively, may have influenced the medical
profession's improved attention to the matter and to cause some
states to review laws that might inhibit appropriate pain
relief. 159
It is therefore appropriate to examine moral responsibilities
to each other, even if the law does not directly or expressly
enforce those responsibilities. Thus, a court, rather than simply
feeling compassion for a person who seeks to end his life, should
examine the ways in which government programs, institutional
systems, individual caregivers, and the prejudices of society
against the dependent and the disabled have contributed to or
perhaps created this desire. The following discussion of two
right to die cases examines, among other things, the courts'
"5 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
158 See id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 789-91 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Robert Burt, The Supreme Court Speak: Not Assisted Suicide but a
Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234 (1997)
(suggesting that the opinions of the court in Glucksberg may reflect a willingness to
recognize a constitutional right to palliative care), see also Shepherd, supra note
142, at 315-17 (discussing the justices' concern that palliative care be available to
people who are terminally ill and suffering).
159 See Alan Meisel, Pharmacists, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Pain Control,
2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 211, 214-26 (1999) (noting statutory and judicial
efforts to spur improvements in end-of-life care, especially in pain control).
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willingness to inquire into the care received by the petitioners
from those who bore responsibility for it.
III. Two CASES: IN RE BOUVIA AND IN RE MS. B
The two cases discussed in this Part reveal contrasting
approaches towards an individual with severe disabilities who
seeks the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.1 60 In both
cases, intelligent, articulate women, experiencing severe
paralysis, sought a court order granting the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment; in the case of Ms. Bouvia case, it was
withdrawal of a feeding tube; 161 in the case of Ms. B, it was
withdrawal of a ventilator. 162 In both cases, the court 163 agreed
that the petitioner was entitled, on the basis of the exercise of
her autonomy, to have the unwanted medical treatment
discontinued. Yet the two courts adopt very different approaches
in the inquiry undertaken prior to approval of the
discontinuance of medical treatment and in their respect and
concern for the patient. While the legal outcomes were
essentially the same, the courts' discussions of the cases before
them differ on the fundamental issue, what care is due the
stranger? The Bouvia case suggests that little care is due while
at the same time revealing similarities with a compassionate
approach-a disconcerting combination. The case of Ms. B is
more aligned with an orientation of responsibility.
A. In re Bouvia
According to the California Court of Appeal, in 1986
Elizabeth Bouvia was 28 years old, quadriplegic, confined to bed,
1O See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
Re B, 2 All E.R. 449, 452 (Fam. 2002). The case of Elizabeth Bouvia, from the 1980s
and the recent 2002 case of a British woman, Ms. B, although reaching similar legal
outcomes, reveal stark differences in the way the courts approach their task.
Whether the differences in the approaches of the two courts might be explained by
the different times in which they took place, or the different legal systems or
cultures, or the varying sensitivities of the particular justices, is not the issue here;
rather, I offer the cases to contrast and to judge their approaches and in particular,
to note that the more recent British case reveals a much closer affinity to
Levinasian concerns than the Bouvia case, which is dismally inhuman, and yet
arguably displays some aspects of a compassionate response.
CI Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
162 Re B, 2 All ER at 452.
16:1 The case of Ms. B was heard before a trial court and the case of Elizabeth
Bouvia before the appellate court.
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in continual pain, had suffered from severe cerebral palsy since
birth, and lived with degenerative arthritis. 164 The court also
recognized that she was intelligent; had earned a college degree;
had married, although her husband had left her; and had been
pregnant but suffered a miscarriage. 16 5 She was without a
permanent place to live and without financial means to support
herself.166 At the time of her petition she was a patient at a
public hospital maintained by the County of Los Angeles. It
appears from the court's opinion that Ms. Bouvia did not
necessarily require hospital care but ended up in the public
hospital simply because it had been difficult to find another
suitable place for her.167  Because she had little ability to
move, 168 she was spoon fed. Because Ms. Bouvia would stop
eating when she felt she could not eat more without nausea and
vomiting, 69 the medical and dietary staff were concerned that
she was not consuming enough nutrients. They were also aware
that she had in the past announced a resolve to starve herself. 70
Accordingly, they inserted a nasogastric tube, against her
wishes, which she sought to have removed by court order. 171
In its opinion, the court discussed at length the inviolability
of the right of a mentally competent patient to refuse medical
treatment. 172 If the court had stopped there and concluded that
because Ms. Bouvia was considered competent she could have
the feeding tube withdrawn at her request, perhaps its opinion
164 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300. Note that Paul Longmore has provided a
more complete rendering of the facts, and disputes many of the findings of fact
accepted by the court. See Longmore, supra note 18, at 152-59. For example,
Longmore states that Bouvia had never been formally diagnosed as having
arthritis, and the court's suggestion that her cerebral palsy and quadriplegia were
progressive could not have been true since cerebral palsy is not a progressive
condition and her quadriplegia was the result of her cerebral palsy. Id. at 157. She
had not become "bedridden" until she had become depressed four years earlier and
refused to get out of bed. Id.
165 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
i(;G Id.
17 Id. ("Efforts by the staff of real party in interest County of Los Angeles and
its social workers to find her an apartment of her own with publicly paid live-in help
or regular visiting nurses to care for her, or some other suitable facility have proved
fruitless.").
168 Id. ("[A] few fingers of one hand and some slight head and facial
movements.").
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 300-04.
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would not have taken on the offensive tone that it did. Because
the hospital 73 argued that previous decisions permitting the
withdrawal of life-support procedures involved only a hastening
of death in terminal situations and Ms. Bouvia's condition was
not terminal, the court entered an evaluation of Elizabeth
Bouvia's quality of life.174 This portion of the court's opinion is so
shockingly insensitive from any ethical standpoint that it does
not take a French philosopher to point out its problems.
Moreover, to the extent it might be considered at all
compassionate, it should serve as a warning to the effects of at
least that kind of compassion. Quoted here are the most
offensive passages:
In Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the quality of her life has been
diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness,
unenjoyability and frustration. She, as the patient, lying
helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her
existence meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so
concluding. 175
Does it matter if it be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months, or 15 to
20 days, if such life has been physically destroyed and its
quality, dignity and purpose gone? 176
Here, if force fed.... [p]etitioner would have to be fed, cleaned,
turned, bedded, toileted by others for 15 to 20 years! Although
alert, bright, sensitive, perhaps even brave and feisty, she must
lie immobile, unable to exist except through physical acts of
others. Her mind and spirit may be free to take great flights
but she herself is imprisoned and must lie physically helpless
subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and
dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness. 177
The statements quoted above from the court's opinion were
unnecessary if we are to believe the court that the decision to
forego life-support "is a moral and philosophical decision that,
173 "The real parties in interest" were the county hospital, its physicians, and
its administrators. Id. at 304.
174 It did so in response to the hospital's argument that certain state interests
should prevail over the right to refuse treatment, namely, the state's interests in
preserving life, preventing suicide, and maintaining the ethical standards of the
medical profession. Id. at 304-07. The other state interest often asserted in these
cases, protecting innocent third parties, was not an issue.
175 Id. at 304.
176 Id. at 305.
177 Id.
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being a competent adult, is hers alone."'178 These quotes are
much more troubling, however, than simply being gratuitous.
Their presence in the opinion, taken together with the opinion's
failure to express interest in or concern about the quality of care
Ms. Bouvia has received, express presumptions about Ms.
Bouvia's suffering and reveal appropriations of that suffering.
Morover, the quotes reveal a thematization of Ms. Bouvia as
someone lacking dignity, a lack of welcome, and a denial of
responsibility on the part of society, her caregivers, and the court
itself. Each of these shortcomings in the opinion are not
necessarily inconsistent with the compassionate approach as
commonly understood. They will be discussed in turn.
The court's venture into Ms. Bouvia's life presumes to know
what she suffers by reference to the judges' own experiences. As
compared to the case of Ms. B, discussed below, the court does
not quote any of the relevant testimony of Ms. Bouvia, but
instead tells us in the court's words how Ms. Bouvia views her
own life. 79 Then it tells us that the court agrees with what it
has described as Ms. Bouvia's view of herself and goes further
and tells us what Ms. Bouvia may be thinking (perhaps should
be thinking?) when it states, "She, as the patient, lying
helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her
existence meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so
concluding."'180 Clearly, the judges believe that a life such as Ms.
Bouvia's would be intolerable for them. To the extent that this
imaginative dwelling on the condition of Ms. Bouvia might be
understood as compassion, it is not clear that compassion serves
Ms. Bouvia well. The sort of compassion the court may be
expressing towards Ms. Bouvia simply serves the purpose of
confirming her own dismal view of her own life. Whereasthe
positive aspects of compassion include prompting aid, as
represented by a child's drawing of a sister getting a bandage for
178 Id. And this, indeed, for better or worse, has become the fairly well-
established law on the issue of the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. For a
critical appraisal of this approach, especially as it applies to people with disabilities,
see McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990) (Springer, J., dissenting), which
disagrees with the majority's confirmation of the right of a man with quadriplegia to
remove a life-sustaining respirator.
179 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304. ("In Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the quality of
her life has been diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness,
unenjoyability and frustration.").
180 Id.
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a little brother, it is not clear that compassion in this case-if
that is what it is- has prompted anything for Ms. Bouvia to
take away and understand as care.
Secondly, the emphasis in the opinion on Ms. Bouvia's
toileting needs thematizes her as a person with no remaining
dignity. Incontinence and toileting dependency signify, without
any apparent need for further discussion, an individual's lack of
dignity. Lack of dignity today further signifies a life not worth
living. Other courts have expressed similar views. In a decision
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that found a
constitutional right to physician assisted suicide-later reversed
in Washington v. Glucksberg181 -the court gave considerable
weight to a person's interest in avoiding dependency on others
for toileting, recognizing "a strong liberty interest in choosing a
dignified and humane death rather than being reduced at the
end of his existence to a childlike state of helplessness, diapered,
sedated, incontinent."'' 8 2  This thematization has the
consequence of permitting society to define a person who is
dependent on others for toileting needs as such primarily, that is
who they are, "a person dependent on others for toileting needs,"
and nothing more. It ignores any talents, wants, and
relationships the person might have. This is further troubling
because one of the primary reasons cited by people for seeking
physician-assisted suicide in Oregon under that state's Death
with Dignity Act is dependencies of just this sort.18 3
Thirdly, the court devalues Ms. Bouvia as a person and in
doing so conveys a lack of welcome for her presence in the world
when it writes, "She ... may consider her existence meaningless.
She cannot be faulted for so concluding."'1 4 Recognizing that
someone is suffering from a difficult condition does not need to
result in a discounting of that person's value, a questioning of
the meaning of that person's existence. The court's own
assessment of the lack of meaning of Bouvia's life reveals its
readiness to view Ms. Bouvia's continued existence as less
important than other people's and by implication less important
than the lives of the members of the court itself. It is true the
181 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F. 3d 790, 814 (1996), rev'd sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
182 Id.
183 See supra note 71.
'8 Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
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court describes her as "alert, bright, sensitive, perhaps even
brave and feisty,"'8 5 but such descriptions are overshadowed by
the descriptions of her need for being "fed, cleaned, turned,
bedded, toileted"'8 6 and the resulting "ignominy, embarrassment,
humiliation and dehumanizing aspects created by her
helplessness."'18 7 Even the term "feisty" is problematic, having
the connotation of someone who asserts an endearing, perhaps
almost amusing, protest against higher authorities that is
inevitably ineffective. I have never heard the word "feisty" used
to describe, for example, a healthy, young, white adult male.
These descriptions of Ms. Bouvia and the life she would lead
if the feeding tube was not removed reveal that the court does
not care whether such a person lives; the judges cannot
understand why she might want to live, for they imagine
themselves in such situations as wanting to die and do not care
whether Ms. Bouvia decides to live or die.
Finally, the court almost willfully refuses to inquire whether
anyone might bear responsibility for the situation in which Ms.
Bouvia now finds herself, focusing instead on the purely physical
nature of her suffering and the fact that she is freely exercising
her will in seeking to avoid that suffering. The court, in its
opinion, makes no inquiry into the quality of care and, in
particular, the quality of the interpersonal relationships Ms.
Bouvia experienced at the hospital with her physicians and other
medical staff. The court understands and accepts the primary
concern of the hospital, physicians, and administrators to be
their wish not to participate in a suicide, which they believe is
illegal. This concern, at least as the court portrays it, appears to
stem from fear of criminal or civil liability 88 rather than any
care or concern for anybody's life, much less care or concern for
Ms. Bouvia herself. The court accepts matter-of-factly that "[Ms.
Bouvia] is without [the] means to go to a private hospital and...
[the] hospital as a public facility was required to accept her."'189
In other words, the court was not concerned with whether Ms.
Bouvia was cared for, liked, or respected, by anyone who was
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 After discussing how Ms. Bouvia's request differed from suicide, the court
wrote, "No criminal or civil liability attaches to honoring a competent, informed
patient's refusal of medical service." Id. at 306.
189 Id.
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responsible for her physical care or, for that matter, by anyone at
all.
The court further failed to recognize that our society may
have had responsibilities to Ms. Bouvia that it did not fulfill.
The court tells us that efforts to find Ms. Bouvia an apartment
with appropriate live-in assistance had been unsuccessful. 190
While we must give the court some credit for relating to us these
facts, revealing some recognition that they may be important in
this controversy, the court does not connect the fact that Ms.
Bouvia wants to die with the fact that she has nowhere to live.1 91
Who wants to live in a hospital? Further, who wants to live in a
hospital which has accepted you only because it is required to do
so and which places a nasogastric tube in your nose because it is
worried about liability should you die there of malnourishment?
The court should have recognized that Elizabeth Bouvia's
hospitalization, when she did not require hospital care, was
deeply troubling. It was deeply troubling in its denial of care for
Ms. Bouvia, who sought to die in those circumstances, and also
as an example of the way in which our society generally fails
people with disabilities.1 92
Finally, the court failed to see its own responsibility to Ms.
Bouvia. Its members failed to see that they were not simply
deciding a question of law but that they were in a relationship of
responsibility to Ms. Bouvia. This relationship existed not
merely in the sense that their decision would permit her to
starve herself, but also in the sense that their words might
matter, that their dismissal of the meaningfulness of Ms.
190 Id. at 300.
191 As Paul Longmore has suggested, there were other factors in Ms. Bouvia's
life besides her physical disability that may have contributed to her request to die.
She had been institutionalized by her mother when she was ten years old,
thereafter moved from one facility to another, with only rare visits from her mother.
As a young adult she earned a college degree and began a master's degree but was
not given the "reasonable accommodations" needed for her field experience and
dropped out. She married and became pregnant. Before her hospitalization she had
suffered a series of personal misfortunes. Her brother drowned, she suffered a
miscarriage, and she separated from her husband. While Ms. Bouvia reported these
experiences to the psychiatric professionals who evaluated her at her lawyers'
request, they ignored the part these experiences may have played in her wish to die
and concluded that her disability was the reason she requested death. Longmore,
supra note 18, at 153-57.
192 The court was not completely heartless. It did suggest that the hospital and
medical staff had a duty to alleviate Ms. Bouvia's pain and suffering, as she refused
food. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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Bouvia's life might hurt her.193 The court further ignored the
fact that its decision, particularly the discussion of the
worthlessness of Ms. Bouvia's life, might have harmful effects on
other people with disabilities.
B. In re B
The court in the recent British case of Ms. B 194 approached
in a very different way a similar request for withdrawal of
treatment. 195 Ms. B, who had recently become quadriplegic as a
result of an illness, sought permission to have her ventilator
removed while she was in the hospital under a doctor's care.
Apparently she could not shut off the ventilator herself, nor did
she wish it to be discontinued slowly through a weaning process,
which would have to take place without the sedation necessary
to ease the pain of dying from lack of oxygen. In a sensitive and
thorough examination of the issues, the judge explained her
decision to permit Ms. B to have her ventilator withdrawn. As in
the Bouvia case, the decision rested on the right of a patient with
the requisite mental capacity to refuse unwanted medical
treatment even if doing so would cause her death. 196 However,
unlike the Bouvia case, the court did not find it necessary to
consider whether an end to life would be in the patient's best
interests. 197 Instead the court was careful to base the right to
have the ventilator removed solely on the patient's autonomy to
"determine what shall be done with one's own body."'98 Thus the
193 With respect to the need for judges to resist distancing themselves from the
people governed by them, see Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for
Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 57-60 (1988).
194 In re B, 2 All ER 449 (Fam. 2002).
195 For criticisms of the approach of the court, see D. Coleman & S. Drake, A
Disability Perspective from the United States on the Case of Ms. B, 28 J. MED.
ETHICS 240 (2002) which discusses concerns about lack of informed consent and
denial of desired treatment alternatives and J. Keown, The Case of Ms. B." Suicide's
Slippery Slope? 28 J. MED ETHICS 238 (2002), which suggests that the court's right
to refuse treatment may actually include a right to commit suicide or be assisted in
suicide by having treatment withdrawn.
196 In re B, 2 All ER at 450 (holding that the key issue was the mental capacity
of the patient and not the grave consequences the decision may have).
197 The Bouvia court, of course, does not expressly or directly assume this task.
However, in concluding that she should be allowed to have the feeding tube
withdrawn even though she was not terminally ill, the court entered into an
evaluation of the quality of her life, as we have seen. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305-
06.
'98 In re B, 2 All ER at 455 (quoting Malette v. Shulman, (1990] DLR 321, 336).
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court's opinion dealt primarily with an examination of the
patient's mental capacity, including fairly sophisticated analyses
of some of the components of that capacity, for example, how one
should handle evidence of ambivalence on the part of the
patient' 99 and whether the patient was capable of assessing the
quality of her future life while she was still in an intensive care
unit, which carries more of an ethos of death, as opposed to a
rehabilitation unit, where patients are coping with their
disabilities and working to become self-sufficient. 200
At the same time that it focused on assuring a true and
accurate expression of autonomous choice, the court also treated
Ms. B with respect, care, appreciation, and welcome. Some
might consider the opinion to be compassionate. Instead, I think
that it avoids some of the more problematic aspects of
compassion that have been outlined above and adopts an
orientation more in line with an ethics of radical responsibility.
It took care not to make presumptions about Ms. B's suffering or
to appropriate or allow others to appropriate her suffering. The
court did not thematize Ms. B by letting her condition stand in
for the person. Finally, it answered Ms. B's call for help and
evaluated how responsibly others had answered her calls.
First, the court is careful to avoid itself and to avoid
sanctioning on the part of others compassion that appropriates
the experiences of the patient. The court quotes with approval
from an article written by Dr. Kim Atkins and published in the
Journal of Applied Philosophy: " 'While we can imagine, we
cannot know objectively 'what it is like to be' another person, no
matter how many facts we are in possession of. . . ,'"201 The
article explains that the irreducibility of the differences between
people means that we must move away from being objective and
move toward understanding the experience of another as it is
subjectively experienced. The court adopts Atkins' language for
this case:
199 See id. at 459-460 (discussing a patient's ambivalence as being relevant only
if it affects mental capacity and applying it to Ms. B); id. at 464 (comparing
situation to Mr. G); id. at 472 (concluding Ms. B is not ambivalent).
200 See id. at 461, 464-65, 472 (demonstrating how Ms. B and others could not
make an informed decision without experiencing life beyond a hospital room).
201 Id. at 469 (quoting Kim Atkins, Autonomy and the Subjective Character of
Experience, 17 J. APPLIED PHIL. 71, 75 (2000)).
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'However disturbing it is to see someone, especially one's loved
one, on something like [a ventilator], it is essential that one
tries to imagine what it is like to be that particular person on [a
ventilator] if one is to attempt to act from respect for that
person's autonomy. The difficulty here lies not in becoming
more objective, but in being appropriately subjective .... I need
to imagine not just what it would be like to me to be on [a
ventilator], but what it would be like for [Ms B].' 20 2
While the court, in quoting the language of Dr. Atkins'
article, embraces imagination as a way of understanding Ms. B's
experience, the sort of imaginative dwelling approved is unlike
typical formulations of compassion and unlike the appropriative
expressions of the Bouvia court. For one, the court acknowledges
the limitations of that imagination, 20 3 and secondly, it insists
that the point of reference should not be the observer but the
person who is suffering. 20 4 Thirdly, the court approves the
language of the article not in the context of determining what is
in Ms. B's best interests but in the context of affirming that she
is exercising an autonomous choice. Thus, the court quotes at
length the testimony of Ms. B herself, rather than explaining
how the court believes that she must feel. For example, the
opinion includes statements, written and oral, from Ms. B about
why she was not willing to be weaned from the ventilator, which
would also eventuate in her death, although not as quickly as
sudden removal. She stated that such a death would be slow
and painful, that she would "feel robbed of a certain amount of
dignity," and that such a death would be more distressing for her
loved ones.205' During her oral testimony, Ms. B was also asked
about her views on attempting rehabilitation and on whether she
wished to die or not to remain alive in her present condition.20 6
In one of her written statements, she set out her understanding
of her situation in the context of her faith.20 7 On the basis of
202 Id. at 469 (quoting Atkins, supra note 201, at 78).
203 Id. at 469 (quoting Atkins, supra note 201, at 75).
204 Id. at 469 (quoting Atkins, supra note 201, at 75) (emphasis added).
205 Id. at 460-61. According to the court, Ms. B "provided two written
statements and gave oral evidence for about an hour and a half." Id. at 459.
206 Id. at 460-62. While these questions were asked by the representative for
the hospital, they are included in the opinion of the court in its discussion of Ms. B's
mental capacity.
207 Id. at 462. The court stated:
The dominant view in the church is that I should wait for God to heal me.
Withdrawing ventilation would be seen as throwing in the towel. I have
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these expressions, the court determined that Ms. B's "wishes
were clear and well-expressed. '" 208 Together with the evidence of
the consultant psychiatrists, they formed a substantial part of
the evidence that Ms. B had the requisite mental capacity to
make the decision to have the ventilator withdrawn. In relating
Ms. B's testimony about her decision, the court did not agree or
disagree with Ms. B's assessment of the prospects for her life,
but let her speak for herself.
With respect to the potential for thematizing, Ms. B's
condition was in many ways like Ms. Bouvia's. Both, for
example, were highly dependent on others for personal care,
such as bathing and toileting.20 9 The Bouvia court, however,
equated such dependency with embarrassment, humiliation, and
ignominy that make life not worth living, while the court in Ms.
B's case described such care as "intimate."210  It neither
suggested that such dependency was horrifying nor even placed
much emphasis upon it. When it was mentioned,21' it was
primarily in the context of the relationship of care that had
developed between Ms. B and the hospital staff. The court
understood that the hospital staff had experienced difficulty in
acceding to Ms. B's request that the ventilator be withdrawn
because they had become emotionally involved in the case.
21 2
"That situation was entirely understandable," the court
concluded. "They [the clinicians] had with the nursing staff kept
questioned myself about this and it has challenged my integrity. It has
been a very difficult process to rationalise what I am doing in the context
of my faith but I feel there is no alternative, as I do not have any realistic
hope of recovery. I have come to believe that people die and become
disabled and God does not always intervene.
Id.
208 Id. at 449, 462.
209 The court tells us in the case of Ms. B, "She is totally dependent on her
carers, who feed, clothe and wash her and assist with her bodily functions." Id. at
459.
210 Id. at 463.
2! There are three references to these matters in the opinion. First, within a
paragraph describing in some detail Ms. B's physical condition, we are told that
"[s]he is totally dependent on her carers, who feed, clothe and wash her and assist
with her bodily functions." Id. at 459. Later, in recording the testimony of Dr. C, the
lead clinician in the case, the court tells us that Dr. C testified that "[s]he did not
feel able to agree with simply switching off Ms. B's ventilation. She would not be
able to do it. She felt she was being asked to kill Ms. B. They had all been looking
after Ms. B for a long time on a very intimate level." Id. at 463. The third reference
is discussed in the text.
212 Id. at 473-74.
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Ms. B alive and looked after her in every respect including her
most intimate requirements." 213 The court saw the dependency
that Ms. B had on others for assistance with her private bodily
functions not as something she should feel shame about, but as
something that drew Ms. B and her health care providers into a
close relationship of care. Intimacy or ignominy? Ms. B and Ms.
Bouvia both required assistance with toileting and other bodily
functions. The court in Ms. B's case did not let the condition of
such dependency stand in for or define her.
Finally, the British court took very seriously the
responsibilities that Ms. B's physicians had towards her and the
responsibilities that the court itself had toward Ms. B, and
understood both sets of responsibilities to include an obligation
of welcome.
The court's opinion revealed a very caring relationship on
the part of the physicians toward Ms. B. Their reluctance or
refusal to participate in the withdrawal of the ventilator
treatment was not wholly an egocentric one, based on their
understanding of their professional role to preserve life and to
heal,214 nor did they consider Ms. B's fate in terms of their
success story or failure, another egocentric hazard of practicing
medicine. Similarly, their primary concern was not their
potential legal liability. Rather, as the court recognized, the
treating doctors had a strong desire for Ms. B to live; over the
course of a year, they had come to know, like and care for her as
a unique human being. The court wrote:
It was clear from their evidence that both the treating
clinicians were deeply distressed by the dilemma which had
faced them over the year that Ms B had spent in the ICU. They
knew her well and respected and liked her. They considered
her to be competent to make decisions about her medical
treatment. They could not, however, bring themselves to
contemplate that they should be part of bringing Ms. B's life to
an end by the dramatic... step of turning off the ventilator. As
I listened to the evidence of each of them I had the greatest
possible sympathy for their position. 215
213 Id. at 473.
214 See id. at 463, 473 (noting that Ms. B's carers had an emotional attachment
that made them compelled to see her live).
215 Id. at 46.-64
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The doctors desired her presence in the world. I must
emphasize that they desired her presence. The doctors were not
simply holding onto an objective principle that they should
preserve any life, but actually wanted Ms. B, not just some
objectively described patient, to live. Dr. C, the lead clinician,
gave oral evidence in the case that she believed that the
physicians had treated Ms. B as if competent to make decisions
but that they felt she shouldn't make the decision to discontinue
ventilation until she had left the environment of the intensive
care unit and experienced a spinal rehabilitation unit. 216
According to the court, Dr. C's "dilemma was not to be against
the wishes of Ms. B but to offer her anything to make her want
to live."217 Even the consulting psychiatrist on the case, who had
not spent as much time caring for Ms. B, expressed a desire for
her to live, while recognizing that she had capacity to refuse
medical treatment. The court wrote: "He accepted that
intellectually there was no inconsistency between Ms. B's vitality
and her wish to die, although emotionally it grieved him, which
was not too strong a word." 218
The court's emphasis on and approval of the caring feelings
that the doctors had for Ms. B establish such feelings as an
important part of the medical care she was receiving. Good care
is not impersonal but embodies a face-to-face relationship
between doctor and patient. Indeed, the court was sympathetic
to the physicians as well, recognizing them also as human beings
in this dilemma and believing they had been placed in the
untenable situation of both caring for Ms. B and being asked to
accede to her request to die. "Obviously," the court wrote, "a
relationship built up and it was, in my view, unjust to the team
in the ICU that the burden of decision and responsibility for Ms.
B largely remained in their hands."21 9 It was the hospital trust
21C See id. at 463-64.
217 Id. at 463 (emphasis added). The court's decision further relates the
following with respect to Dr. C's testimony:
She did not feel able to agree with simply switching off Ms B's ventilation.
She would not be able to do it. She felt she was being asked to kill Ms B.
They had all been looking after Ms B for a long time on a very intimate
level. She felt that a lot more needed to be done for these patients.
Id.
218 Id. at 466.
219 Id. at 473.
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that had a duty to resolve the dilemma "and to do so with some
degree of urgency for the sake of all concerned." 220
Finally, the court did not see itself as distant from or outside
of the events unfolding in the case but saw itself in a
relationship with Ms. B and with the hospital staff as well.
Courts are institutions but the decisions made by them are made
by persons, in this case, one person, the Right Honorable Dame
Elizabeth Butler-Sloss. This court, through this judge,
expressed a human response to the call of Ms. B. In Levinasian
terms, Ms. B had called, and the judge heard the call and
answered it. While the law required Dame Butler-Sloss to allow
Ms. B to be removed from the ventilator under the principle of
autonomy, and indeed Butler-Sloss had no quarrel with this
principle of law, she nevertheless expressed her own respect and
care for Ms. B. She did this in a number of ways. As earlier
explained, the judge let Ms. B speak for herself by quoting
extensive portions of her testimony, including some in which Ms.
B spoke about her faith. The judge, in accepting that testimony
as positive evidence of Ms. B's mental capacity to choose to have
the ventilator removed, commented on Ms. B's humor, her
articulateness, her insight, and her intelligence, calling her an
"exceptionally impressive witness." 221  In the portion of the
opinion in which she concludes that Ms. B does have the right to
have the ventilator removed, Dame Butler-Sloss took care to
point out that her decision was not a decision that Ms. B will
have the ventilator removed but only a decision that recognized
that the power to decide resides with Ms. B in the future and
that the possibility remains that Ms. B might decide to accept
rehabilitation and continue life. 222 Indeed, the judge would have
liked to see Ms. B make that decision for continued life:
I would like to add how impressed I am with her as a person,
with the great courage, strength of will and determination she
has shown in the last year, with her sense of humour, and her
understanding of the dilemma she has posed to the hospital.
She is clearly a splendid person and it is tragic that someone of
her ability has been struck down so cruelly. I hope she will
220 Id. at 474 (differentiating between what should be expected of individual
carers and the hospital trust as a whole).
221 Id. at 462 (remarking that Ms. B had done a great deal of investigation and
was well informed about her decision).
222 See id. at 472-73 (stating that Ms. B is not bound by her past decision and
that she should rethink her choice).
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forgive me for saying, diffidently, that if she did reconsider her
decision, she would have a lot to offer the community at
large. 2
23
The judge desired that Ms. B live. She welcomed her.
CONCLUSION
Because of the problems associated with compassion's
imaginative dwelling, its basis in equality, and the lack of any
moral duty associated with it, we must be wary of thinking that
compassion can be that caring response that many of us believe
has a legitimate role in questions of law and social policy. If
compassion is the best we can do, we must be alert, suspicious,
and watchful in our use of it. Compassion has the potential to
discount, devalue, and ignore people who are in need.
The work of Emmanuel Levinas poses challenges to our
current ways of thinking about law and social policy, especially
in relation to issues of suffering and need but also in relation to
people who are not suffering but commonly thought to be so,
such as people with disabilities. The orientation of welcome,
alterity, rupture, and responsibility that characterizes an ethics
of radical responsibility provides a compelling interruption to the
traditional egocentric foundations of American law and the dim
impulse of compassion that sometimes softens it.
223 Id. at 473.
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